Jane Burgermeister* warned the world about Margaret Chan, and the phony flu pandemic

 

Jane Burgermeister* warned the world about Margaret Chan, and the phony flu pandemic

FLU IS NOT THE BIGGEST DANGER …

IT’S THE VACCINE

By David Icke

and so what's China's position in this campaign...we'll see

We need to grasp – here, now – that we have long crossed the line into a fully-fledged fascist dictatorship. It has hidden itself to most people this far, but it is about to lift the veil.

It is no longer an option to do nothing or passively acquiesce to authority out of fear or apathy. Or, at least, it’s not if we care about our freedoms and, most importantly, those of our children and grandchildren who will have to live almost their entire lives under a global jackboot to the neck of sheer, undiluted evil.

The word ‘evil’ is much overused and I don’t say it lightly; but we are dealing with evil in the sense that the word is the reverse of ‘live’. Those behind the conspiracy to cull the human population and turn the rest into little more than computer terminals are anti-life. They have no respect for it and no empathy with those who suffer the consequences of their actions, no matter how appalling.

I have been warning of what was coming for nearly 20 years and it is not ‘coming’ any more – it’s here. No more excuses from anyone, please. We have to deal with it. We have to draw a line in the sand and say no more.

Never was this more important than with the conspiracy to force swine flu vaccination upon the global population. The swine flu virus was created in a laboratory to generate  mass panic with the specific intention of forcing everyone to have the vaccine. Problem-Reaction-Solution. This ‘natural’ swine flu virus apparently contains genes from humans, birds and pigs from several continents.

If you concoct and release a virus and then implement a clearly long-planned mass vaccination programme, there can be only one sensible conclusion: swine flu is not the biggest danger here – it’s the vaccine.

The scale and speed of the planned vaccination programme is insane given that the overwhelming majority of those who have contracted the virus have had very mild symptoms. Dr Peter Holden of the Rothschild-controlled British Medical Association said that although swine flu was not causing serious illness they were eager to start a mass vaccination campaign, beginning with ‘priority groups’. Ugh?? This is not about public health and never was.

Those administering the vaccinations have no clue what is in them or their potential effect. They are just repeaters thinking what they are told to think and doing what they are told to do. Only those at the core of the conspiracy, and those who bother to research it, know what the game is.

The Austrian journalist, Jane Bürgermeister, has filed criminal charges with the FBI against the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations, Barack Obama, a Rockefeller, a Rothschild, and others, over a plot she uncovered to cull the population with a deadly swine flu vaccine.

parts 2-6 on Rumble [complete]

She said that bird flu and swine flu have been developed in laboratories and released on the public with the aim of mass murder through vaccination. Her filed document is called Bioterrorism Evidence. She writes here about the United States, but what she says applies everywhere:

‘There is evidence that an international corporate criminal syndicate, which has annexed high government office at Federal and State level, is intent on carrying out a mass genocide against the people of the United States by using an artificial (genetic) flu pandemic virus and forced vaccine program to cause mass death and injury and depopulate America in order to transfer control of the United States to the United Nations and affiliated security forces (UN troops from countries such as China, Canada, the UK and Mexico).

There is proof many organisations – World Health Organisation, UN as well as vaccine companies such as Baxter and Novartis – are part of a single system under the control of a core criminal group, who give the strategic leadership, and who have also funded the development, manufacturing and release of artificial viruses in order to justify mass vaccinations with a bioweapon substance in order to eliminate the people of the USA, and so gain control of the assets, resources etc of North America.

The motivation for the crime is classical robbery followed by murder although the scale and method are new in history. The core group sets its strategic goals and operative priorities in secret using committees such as the Trilateral Commission, and in person to person contact in the annual Bilderberg meeting.’

Jane Bürgermeister is a rare real journalist, so much so that she was sacked from her job as European correspondent of the Renewable Energy World website after she filed the charges with the FBI. Renewable Energy? It is their backbone and sense of decency that need renewing, but it shows how controlled everything is.

What Bürgermeister describes in her FBI submission is a summary of what I have been trying to get across in my books and talks for nearly two decades. A cabal of interbreeding families is seeking to impose a global fascist dictatorship of total human control.

Their vehicle is a secret society network structured like a transnational corporation. The operational headquarters is in Europe, in places like Rome [Vatican], London, Paris, Brussels and Berlin. I refer to this as ‘the Spider’ and it dictates to the global web.

There are subsidiary networks of secret societies in every country that answer to the ‘Spider’. Their job is to control their country’s politics, banking, business, military, media, medicine, and so on, and introduce in their sphere of influence the global agenda dictated by the ‘Spider’. Those on the inner levels of this structure are collectively known as the ‘Illuminati’.

This is how they coordinate between apparently unconnected governments, corporations, media groups etc. The Rothschild and Rockefeller dynasties (the same bloodline) are fundamentally involved in this, as I have long exposed, and they dominate pharmaceutical medicine and government ‘health’ policy worldwide.

The web controls governments, the pharmaceutical industry, or ‘Big Pharma’, the World Health Organisation and  public heath ‘protection’ agencies like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States.  In short, they control the entire medical system.

The Illuminati cabal established global bodies like the World Health Organisation, World Bank and World Trade Organisation to transfer power from the many to the few. Their goal is a world government, world central bank, world currency and world army.

You have to centralise power to impose a global dictatorship and diversity is your worst nightmare. The Illuminati network is behind ‘globalisation’ and the creation of superstate dictatorships like the European Union for this same reason.

Given this essential background, it was no surprise when I saw the list of names and organisations in Jane Bürgermeister’s submission to the FBI:

‘Specifically, evidence is presented that Defendants President Barack Obama, President of the United States, David Nabarro, UN System Coordinator for Influenza,

Margaret Chan, Director-General of World Health Organisation, Kathleen Sibelius, Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Secretary Janet Napolitano, the Department of Homeland Security, David de Rothschild, banker, David Rockefeller, banker, George Soros, banker, and Alois Stoger, Austrian Health Minister, among others, are part of this international corporate crime syndicate which has, marching as one phalanx to carry out their plan of genocide, have developed, produced, stockpiled and used biological weapons to eliminate the population of the United States for financial and political gain.’

Bürgermeister says there is clear evidence that pharmaceutical companies and international government agencies are actively engaged in producing, developing, manufacturing and distributing biological agents classified as the most deadly bioweapons on earth.

She says the swine flu virus was created and released with help from the Rothschild/Rockefeller-controlled World Health Organisation – the very body which then said it was spreading so fast that a pandemic had to be declared.

The symptoms of ‘swine flu’ at present are pretty much the same as regular flu and it is easy to call everything ‘swine flu’ to increase the official numbers. The British government has announced that people should no longer see a doctor if they have flu symptoms and instead a system of diagnosis over the phone has been introduced without laboratory confirmation. How convenient for fixing the figures:

Jane Bürgermeister has filed bioterrorism charges against pharmaceutical giants like Novartis International AG, based in Basel, Switzerland, Baxter AG, based in Austria, and its parent company, Baxter International in Deerfield, Illinois. Guess who is providing much of the swine flu vaccine for mass inoculation – Baxter International and Novartis.

This is the same Baxter International that sent bird flu virus to European laboratories ‘by mistake’ earlier this year and it was mixed with a seasonal flu virus to create a much more dangerous strain.

Last year at least 81 people were killed by Baxter International’s contaminated blood-thinning product, heparin, which was made in China from, among other things, pig intestines. Isn’t pharmaceutical medicine wonderful? The contaminated heparin also seriously injured hundreds of people and it was revealed that the factory of Baxter’s Chinese supplier had never been inspected by either American or Chinese public ‘protection’ agencies.

More than 50 dialysis patients died in 2001 because of faults with Baxter International equipment, and this month Baxter Healthcare Corporation, a subsidiary of Baxter International, reached an out-of-court settlement of two million dollars with the State of Kentucky. Baxter had been caught inflating the cost of intravenous drugs sold to Kentucky Medicaid by as much as 1,300 per cent.

This is clearly a company you can trust and it is now is a major source of the swine flu vaccine that governments across the world want to impose upon entire populations with the most minimal safety checks. The vaccine is being fast-tracked through the regulatory system with safety trials lasting less than a week. The London Times reported:

‘Regulators at the European Medicines Agency said the fast-tracked procedure has involved clinical trials of a “mock-up” vaccine similar to the one that will be used for the biggest mass vaccination programme in generations. It will be introduced into the general population while regulators continue to carry out simultaneous clinical trials.’

My emphasis.

There is no need for ‘trials’ at all, except for public consumption. They already know what is in it and its effect. The drug companies have even been given immunity from prosecution from death or injury from the vaccine in a document signed by Obama’s Secretary of Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius.

Baxter International said it will be shipping swine flu vaccine worldwide by the end of July and the potential profits are fantastic; but this is not primarily about money. It about a long-planned mass-culling of the human population.

We are told that the drug companies and the World Health Organisation have been working at fever pitch to develop a vaccine for the ‘new’ swine flu strain known as H1N1, but … wait for it … Baxter International filed a patent for the H1N1 vaccine on August 28th 2008. Click here to read …

Baxter Vaccine Patent Application US 2009/0060950 A1 says:

‘… In particular preferred embodiments the composition or vaccine comprises more than one antigen … such as influenza A and influenza B in particular selected from of one or more of the human H1N1, H2N2, H3N2, H5N1, H7N7, H1N2, H9N2, H7N2, H7N3, H10N7 subtypes, of the pig flu H1N1, H1N2, H3N1 and H3N2 subtypes, of the dog or horse flu H7N7, H3N8 subtypes or of the avian H5N1, H7N2, H1N7, H7N3, H13N6, H5N9, H11N6, H3N8, H9N2, H5N2, H4N8, H10N7, H2N2, H8N4, H14N5, H6N5, H12N5 subtypes.’

The patent was published in March 2009, a month before the virus was released in Mexico in April, but it was filed seven months before this ‘new strain’ was officially known about. It is the most blatant set-up you could ever see.

The patent includes the following ingredients and toxicity warning:

‘Suitable adjuvants can be selected from mineral gels, aluminium hydroxide, surface active substances, lysolecithin, pluronic polyols, polyanions or oil emulsions such as water in oil or oil in water, or a combination thereof. Of course, the selection of the adjuvant depends on the intended use. E.g. toxicity may depend on the destined subject organism and can vary from no toxicity to high toxicity.’

Nice.

Another Big Pharma corporation involved is Novartis in Switzerland. Chief executive, Daniel Vasella, is a regular attendee of the secretive Bilderberg meetings that I have long exposed in my books. The Bilderberg Group, named in Jane Bürgermeister’s FBI submission, is the creation of the Rothschild dynasty and has been administered for decades by people like David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger.

It answers to a [Vatican controlled], Rothschild secret society in Britain called the Round Table. This was first headed by the Rothschild agent, Cecil Rhodes, who plundered southern Africa on the family’s behalf. Vasella attended the last Bilderberg meeting last May, just as the swine flu scare was being engineered, and bingo, his company comes up with the vaccine.

I am not saying that people will die in large numbers immediately. This is certainly possible, but it would hardly encourage others to continue to be inoculated. The effects may be immediate in some, probably medium or longer-term in most, to hide the true source of their problem. What we do know is that we are seeing a long-prepared plan for mass vaccination by people who could not care less about the health of the population. That says everything about the real motivation, but only those in the shadows know what the effect is designed to be.

For sure, it will involve targeting the human immune system. Once that has been disabled, it’s over as we see with the immune-destroyer we call AIDS. People don’t die of AIDS, they die of diseases the immune system would normally deal with.

The excellent work of people like the American researcher and author, Patrick Jordan, have exposed the unfolding plan to kill vast numbers of people through engineered viruses and vaccines. He says that they have long perfected vaccines that switch off the human immune system and US troops have often been used as guinea pigs.

Patrick Jordan’s research uncovers a three-vaccine system that the Illuminati have developed. The first inoculation turns off white blood cells (the immune system); the second injects viruses; and the third switches the immune system on again.

In the middle period viruses are expanding around the body, but the person doesn’t feel sick because the immune system is not fighting them. When the immune system kicks in again it unleashes such an assault on the virus cocktail that it kills the body.

This is known as a cytokine storm when the immune system is so overwhelmed that it sends too many antibodies at the same time to infected areas of the body and the body kills itself.

It is also the case that the World Health Organisation has asked for live swine flu virus to be in the vaccine and it is quite possible that they will expand and maybe increase the strength of the virus through the vaccine. The WHO website says:

‘In view of the anticipated limited vaccine availability at global level and the potential need to protect against “drifted” strains of virus, SAGE recommended that promoting production and use of vaccines such as those that are formulated with oil-in-water adjuvants and live attenuated influenza vaccines was important.’

Jane Bürgermeister’s evidence has been supported by Wayne Madsen, a former US Naval Intelligence officer and now an investigative journalist. He said that a top United Nations scientist concluded that the H1N1 swine flu virus has certain transmission ‘vectors’ that suggest the new flu strain has been genetically-manufactured as a military biological warfare weapon. The UN expert believes that Ebola, HIV/AIDS, and the current A-H1N1 swine flu virus are all biological warfare agents. Madsen writes:

‘Past swine flu outbreaks have been spread from pigs to humans, who then passed the flu on to other humans. However, with A-H1N1, there have been no reported infections of pigs. In fact, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), A-H1N1 has gene segments from North American swine, bird and human flu strains and a segment from Eurasian swine flu.’

Wayne Madsen also says that his sources confirm that the Centers for Disease Control and the US army recovered the body of an Inuit woman who died in 1918 in Brevig Mission, Alaska, from an outbreak of Spanish flu that killed 100 million people worldwide in 18 months.

Madsen was told that genetic material from the corpse provided the basis for the development of the H5N1 avian, or ‘bird flu’, strain at the US Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland. This lab was the origin of the anthrax attacks on US Congress and media targets shortly after September 11th in 2001.

All this will sound way out in the Twilight Zone to those new to this sort of information, but what they need to understand is that these Illuminati families are utterly insane. They don’t think like most of the rest of us, so please don’t judge what they would do by what you would do. It’s not the same, because they’re not the same.

The Illuminati plan for the world includes a mass cull of the population and the microchipping of every man, woman and child. Microchips would allow everyone to be tracked 24/7, but it goes much further than that.

Computer technology communicating with the chips has the potential to manipulate people mentally, emotionally and physically. This could be done en masse or individually through the chip’s unique transmitter-receiver signal. Killing someone from a distance would be a synch.

I mention this because, as readers of my books will know, a CIA scientist told me in 1997 that microchips developed in the secret government-military research projects were even then small enough to be injected by hypodermic needles in vaccination programmes. With nanotechnology, no one would know.

The fake swine flu scare of 1976 was a trial-run for what is happening now. These events are planned way in advance and these sick people are extremely thorough in their preparations.

The scare began with the death of an Army recruit at Fort Dix in New Jersey which the government said was caused by ‘swine flu’. The recruit was the only death from the virus in 1976, but the government instigated a vaccination programme for all Americans supported by a campaign of outrageous propaganda based, as always, on terrifying people.

The result was that at least 25 people were killed by the vaccine and hundreds seriously harmed while the Fort Dix recruit was the only death from swine flu -  even if the government was telling the truth about the diagnosis. We are now heading for a re-run on a vastly bigger scale.

The British and American governments have ordered enough swine flu vaccine for the entire population and other countries are following suit. Of course, they are; the ‘Spider’ has demanded it.

It is clear they intend to make vaccination compulsory and threaten parents with losing their children if they refuse to submit to this fascism. Even before that, the pressure on parents to submit to the dictates of the state are going to be considerably increased.

The Rockefeller-dominated Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States have said that children who have never had a flu ‘shot’ may need to be vaccinated four times in the Autumn – twice for seasonal flu and twice for swine flu. Making up for lost time, eh? Other children will get three shots – note the three, given Patrick Jordan’s information.

The Rothschild-Rockfeller front-man, Barack Obama, has demanded that his ‘health reform’ bill is passed into law by August, just ahead of mass vaccination. The bill was approved this week by the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pension Committee and it includes the targeting of parents who do not have their children vaccinated. It authorises the Orwellian ‘demonstration program to improve immunization coverage’. The bill says:

‘Under this program, CDC will provide grants to states to improve immunization coverage of children, adolescents, and adults through the use of evidence-based interventions. States may use funds to implement interventions that are recommended by the Community Preventive Services Task Force, such as reminders or recalls for patients or providers, or home visits.’

‘Interventions’? Home visits? It is one step away from immunising your children by force or having you arrested for refusing to comply. World Health Organisation ‘recommendations’ are binding on its nearly 200 member countries when a pandemic emergency is declared under the International Health Regulations Act of 2005 and WHO pandemic plan of April this year.

Margaret Chan, the WHO Director General, declared a swine flu pandemic when there wasn’t one so these emergency powers would be activated and this lackey of the Rothschild-Rockefeller cabal is going to be recommending compulsory vaccination. She’s virtually done it already. The WHO advisory board on vaccination policy includes executives from … Baxter, Novartis, GSK and Sanofi Pasteur.

 a cheerful Communist, Margaret Chan with appropriate logo behind her

Last week Margaret ‘Be Afraid’ Chan warned that a global pandemic of drug-resistant tuberculosis may be imminent with potentially ‘catastrophic consequences’.  She prattled on …

‘The situation is already alarming, and poised to grow much worse very quickly. This is a situation set to spiral out of control. Call it what you may: a time bomb or a powder keg. Any way you look at it, this is a potentially explosive situation.’

Oh, get a life woman. When will TB ‘explode’? As soon as they’ve circulated it sufficiently, I guess.

What is happening now has been planned for a very long time. Builders have been at work for months in a highly-secretive operation at a council building called Westridge, just down the road from me on the Isle of Wight.

The builders themselves have become very suspicious as one group is given plans for one section of the work and then a totally new group is brought in for the next, and so on. No single group sees the whole picture and now people in unmarked white vans are turning up to complete the job.

I had a look through a window near a fire escape after everyone had left and it is clearly an emergency response centre of some kind. The builders were told they had to finish their work by mid-July without fail and, apparently, something similar is happening all over the country.

If you listen carefully, the dark suits tell you what is going to happen. As I said in a recent newsletter, I kept hearing the mantra from different agencies and countries about the dangers of a massive increase in swine flu in the autumn and that is now their target for mass vaccination to really get moving.

Now I am hearing that the virus could become more deadly in the same period and it could well be that they are planning to increase the numbers who die from swine flu to generate more panic and demands to be vaccinated.

We should not forget, however, that ‘normal flu’ kills hundreds of thousands of people a year worldwide. Have no doubt that large numbers of those people will now be officially designated as a death from swine flu, whether they are or not.

It was always going to come to this and aware people need to be strong and come together in collective non-compliance. These crazies want access to our bodies and those of our children for a reason that is nothing whatsoever to do with health.

Most people will line up with their children like good little sheep. They will accept the blatant lies without question and the authorities will use those people to target others who refuse. You will hear nonsense like ‘You are putting my children at risk’.

In fact, it is the programmed people who stand in line who are putting all children at risk. The authorities will claim that those who decline are preventing ‘herd immunity’ when all they have done is withdraw from the herd mentality.

This is a time for like-minded people to come together in mutual support and to prepare a strategy of peaceful non-compliance. There is far more strength in numbers than doing this alone.

We must not succumb to compulsory vaccination, nor pressure from those who lack a mind of their own. If we concede our freedom to stop the state enforcing vaccination upon us and our children, what the hell freedom is left?

 

VRIC MONITOR No. 28 | China Expands Strategic Ports in Latin America

October 18, 2022

Brazil is on the brink of its most important election in recent history. On October 2, Brazilian voters went to the polls for the first round of the general election. In an outcome that shocked some, incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro and former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva advanced to the second round with 43 and 48 percent of the vote, respectively. Many thought that Lula would win in the first round but the results put the two against each other for a run-off vote on October 30.

Brazil’s elections have important ramifications for the world. President Bolsonaro has been pushed closer to Russia and Iran in recent months; however, a Lula victory would openly embrace the VRIC and its malign regional allies, namely Venezuela and Bolivia. If Bolsonaro is reelected, the prognosis is more nuanced. In a recent episode of the Border Wars Podcast, SFS Senior Fellow Leonardo Coutinho and the former Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo stated that a second term for President Bolsonaro would likely not seek out a closer relationship with China, but could be steered into one. And a potential Lula presidency would significantly deepen Brazil and China’s relationship. Making international observers nervous about the outcome of Brazil’s election.

This comes as American policymakers are increasingly concerned about China’s influence in Latin America. In an unclassified report to the U.S. Congress, sent in early July, the State Department noted that China’s acquisition of technologies, facilities, and infrastructure in Latin America has military purposes. Shortly after, while speaking at the Aspen Security Conference, the head of U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Laura Richardson, described how Chinese state-owned companies on both sides of the Panama Canal “could be turned quickly toward military capabilities.” Many of these Chinese state-owned companies have ties to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and are involved in around 40 port infrastructure projects, from Mexico down to Peru, that combined with eleven satellite ground stations in Latin America, provide China with strategic positioning in the Western Hemisphere.

Russia complements, rather than competes with China’s strategic positioning by expanding its GLONASS satellite navigation system throughout Latin America. Already with four stations in Brazil, one in Nicaragua, and another being built in Venezuela, it is reported that Russia is negotiating to install additional satellite systems in Ecuador, Cuba, and Mexico, as recently announced by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.

Within this context, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken took a three-country tour of South America in October, to Colombia, Chile, and Peru in an effort to shore up support to countries whose democracies are being challenged. The question remains; however, is promoting democracy enough in a region that sees the rise of a new populist, authoritarian wave?

Venezuelan migration to the U.S. southern border has exploded this year. Customs and Border Patrol reported the number of encounters has increased more than 3,000 percent from 2020 to 2022 with more than 25,000 encounters in August alone. A classified report by the Department of Homeland Security, prompted concern by U.S. representatives that the Maduro regime is encouraging violent criminals from Venezuela to embed within migrant caravans marching to the U.S. border. With increased numbers of migrants, border states are now directing bus loads of migrants north, most recently to Chicago, Washington D.C. and Martha’s Vineyard in Massachusetts.

This prompted some political backlash from the Venezuelan community in the U.S. that intensified on October 12, when the Biden administration announced a new policy that would enforce large-scale border deportations of Venezuelan migrants to Mexico. The policy also introduced a new parole program to provide a legal pathway for up to 24,000 Venezuelan nationals to fly to the U.S.

While the Biden administration attempts to mitigate the surge in Venezuelan migrants, Nicolás Maduro touts Venezuela’s economy. A ceremony propagating the reopening of the Colombia-Venezuela border, held on September 26, tries to add to that narrative. Full diplomatic relations have resumed and Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro ceded control to the Maduro regime of the Monómeros fertilizer company. But not all can be propagandized. An attempt to restart direct flights between Colombia and Venezuela failed due to existing sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned airline, Conviasa.

U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently visited Colombia, Chile, and Peru, to re-engage some of the region’s struggling democracies. Blinken’s trip; however, was overtaken by the news of an alarming prisoner swap on October 1 when the Biden administration released Maduro wife’s nephews, serving out an 18-year prison sentence for transporting 800 kilos of cocaine, in exchange for seven Americans, to include former U.S. Marine Matthew Heath who was imprisoned in Venezuela on dubious charges. This precedent incentivizes members of the Bolivarian Threat Network to consider arresting more Americans on false charges to use as political capital for concessions from the United States.

American military leaders have raised alarm about a surge in Chinese-owned or controlled ports in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to U.S. Southern Command, Chinese companies are constructing at least 40 ports on both sides of the Panama Canal in Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and the Bahamas. One mega project, the Chancay Port Terminal, 67 miles outside of Lima, is in its second year of construction and claims to be the largest and most strategic port for China in South America. Led by China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), connected to the Communist Party of China, this project alone is a four billion dollar investment and has been dubbed, “China’s gateway to Latin America.”

The concern that China could begin to use strategic ports to host Chinese warships comes as Uruguay’s General Assembly approved the implementation of joint defense efforts with China to increase collaboration between their respective Defense Ministries, cooperating in the areas of research and acquisition of defense goods and services and promoting combined military exercises and training.

Equally concerning is China’s growing use of satellite ground stations in Latin America. President Xi Jinping has called on the country to become a space power, with a government paper highlighting how the space industry serves its “national strategy.” A recent report by CSIS details the eleven satellite ground stations in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela that are owned or controlled by China, many with connections to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Strategic ports, piers, and satellite ground stations are just a piece of the puzzle. Economic overtures continue to be China’s primary outreach to Latin America. In September, Ecuador reached a deal to restructure its debt to China, opening up millions of barrels of Ecuadorian crude to the Asian giant in a spot sale. This follows an audit by Ecuador’s Congress earlier this year that concluded the Andean country lost up to $5 billion due to Petrochina, an arm of China National Petroleum Corporation, undervaluing the price of oil during the tenure of Rafael Correa.

The Ukraine War continues to rage on with Russia re-launching another military assault on Kyiv and other cities on October 11. While the West scrambles to bridge the North-South divide aggravated by the war, Ukraine has appointed a special envoy for Latin America, Amb. Ruslan Spirin, who is charged with combating disinformation from Russian state-owned media in Spanish and Portuguese.

Russian disinformation in Latin America was on full-blast during the International Army Games in August, especially in Venezuela. Social media was flooded with videos and posts of Venezuelan, Russian, Iranian, Chinese, Cuban, Bolivian, Nicaraguan, and other soldiers, training side by side in Ft. Terepaima in the Lara State of Venezuela. Meanwhile, the Sputnik radio network and a Nicaraguan state media conglomerate inked a deal making Russian content available to more than 20 Nicaraguan state channels, broadcasting to 6.6 million people throughout the country. This could catapult Nicaragua to Venezuela’s status, which according to media watchdog, NewsGuard, has become Russia’s best conduit for disinformation in Latin America.

In September, Nicaragua took part in another major multinational military exercise, the Vostok 2022 in Russia’s far east and the Sea of Japan, to showcase the blossoming joint capabilities of Moscow and Beijing, with the People’s Republic of China, for the first time, sending troops to the exercise from all three branches of its military.

Venezuela is also expanding cooperation with Russia in all areas, including in the energy and pharmaceutical sectors. Vladimir Putin exalted Caracas as its “strategic partner and reliable ally in Latin America” before announcing that a GLONASS satellite navigation system is being built in Venezuela. A similar satellite base in Nicaragua has raised suspicions, and President Andrés Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Russia will install a GLONASS satellite system in Mexico, for “peaceful purposes.”

Protests erupted in Iran on September 17, triggered by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who died after being arrested by “morality police” for not wearing a hijab according to regime standards. While many believe the protests could lead to the end of the Islamic Republic, across the Atlantic things are business as usual.

On October 14, an Argentine court granted permission for the final five crew members of the Venezuelan cargo plane Emtrasur YV3531 to leave the country. Four days later, the Iranian crew members met with Venezuelan Ambassador Stella Marina Lugo de Montilla at the Hotel Canning in Buenos Aires prior to taking off at 3:25AM on Tuesday, October 18 to Santa Cruz de la Sierra vía flight Boliviana de Aviación (BoA) 701. At least two of the Iranian crew members detained have confirmed ties to the IRGC and were found to have threatening messages and photos of weapons on their cell phones. With the ruling in Argentina, the cargo and crew have effectively been released but the actual plane, a Boeing 747-300(M), remains seized in Buenos Aires for violating U.S. sanctions and export controls. Meaning that the Maduro regime will likely continue to exert pressure on the Alberto Fernández government in Argentina to release the cargo plane.

As the cargo plane saga continues, Iran is capitalizing on the Russia-induced food insecurity crisis in Brazil through a “fertilizer” diplomacy push. In March, Brazilian Agriculture Minister Tereza Cristina traveled to Tehran to purchase urea (fertilizer). Then, Iranian Ambassador Hossein Gharibi began a series of trips to the agricultural producing regions of Brazil, likely to establish himself among rural leaders as a strategic partner of Brazil. In May, the Brazil-Iran Chamber of Commerce invited Brazilian businessmen on a two-week tour of Tehran to learn about investment opportunities. Meanwhile, an Iranian diplomatic mission in Brasilia visited the Foreign Relations and National Defense Commission of the Brazilian Congress to ratify its commitment to send 2 million tons of urea (fertilizer) by the end of the year.

At the UN General Assembly in New York, Iran’s foreign minister met with counterparts from Cuba and Nicaragua, while President Ebrahim Raisi held a closed-door meeting with Bolivia’s President Luis Arce to discuss strategic cooperation. Meanwhile, Venezuela and Uruguay are both becoming host to Iranian refineries, with the “El Palito” refinery on the Paraguana Peninsula in Venezuela now refining crude oil as the first overseas Iranian-refinery in a foreign country.

How the BRI is shaping global trade and what to expect from the initiative in its second decade

No. 4, December 2023

Introduction

At the end of November, China’s Belt and Road Construction Leadership Group released a ten year plan for the next phase of the BRI. This comes a month after Beijing celebrated ten years of China’s Belt and Road Initiative by hosting the Third BRI Forum with attendees from 150 countries. This special edition of the Global China Competition Tracker looks at the BRI’s first decade of evolution, assesses its impact, and asks what the future of Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy initiative might look like. 

The BRI has had considerable influence on China, on BRI host countries and the world. It would be wrong to see it as a declining force simply because Beijing is allocating less finance to BRI projects: many of the BRI’s initial goals were achieved early on in its first decade. The BRI has evolved over time to suit Beijing’s strategic goals. This special edition of the tracker examines the BRI’s impact on trade flows through the ports sector - critical logistics nodes along the BRI. We look at the ports built, bought, operated and used by China’s state-owned national champions. 

First, Clark Banach maps out China’s footprint across global port ecosystems in a detailed map. Banach, who is MERICS Futures Fellow, explains the more deeply Chinese SOE’s are entrenched in a port, the more strongly it is pulled into China’s orbit at the expense of trade with other partners. 

Second, MERICS Lead Analyst Jacob Gunter builds on Banach’s quantitative analysis with a qualitative look at how China’s involvement in ports develops. Gunter details China’s presence in Mediterranean and Northern European shipping ecosystems and how ports can spread distortions emanating from China’s own economic model. He examines how port networks create potential dependency and influence risks. 

Banach and Gunter then take a closer look at four Mediterranean ports with Chinese participation. In each case study, they assess Chinese SOEs’ strategic and commercial success or failure. The case studies look at port holdings or operations in Greece, Spain, Algeria, and Israel and offer a way to benchmark Beijing’s desired outcomes and how far they are being achieved. 

Finally, they suggest what the future of the BRI might look like, drawing on President Xi Jinping’s speech to Third BRI Forum and their own research. The future BRI can be expected to leverage its extensive built infrastructure further, while shifting focus towards green energy and telecoms equipment. China’s green transition industries suffer from overcapacity, so they need export outlets, while telecoms giants like Huawei and ZTE must secure and expand their footprints in more neutral markets to compensate for restrictions on their activities in liberal democratic markets. 
 

Chinese port holdings and projects impact trade beyond the BRI

The BRI was officially introduced in 2013 as part of Xi Jinping’s agenda to expand China’s global influence. However, the initiative had been gathering speed since 1999, first as the “Go Out Policy” (which encouraged Chinese businesses to find partners in international markets), then as the “Going Global Strategy.” By the time Xi Jinping officially baptized the BRI as “One Belt One Road,” Chinese firms had secured terminal operating contracts at ports in 14 countries (in order of agreement: United Kingdom, Argentina, Pakistan, Belgium, Malta, Poland, Spain, Egypt, Angola, United States, Greece, Sweden, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Togo). In the last 10 years, the network of global influence has expanded to over 75 countries. 

To better understand how this network of Chinese owned, operated or built port terminals affects world trade, we identified changes in exports, imports, and total trade flows after signing a contract. Our findings suggest China’s port network has played a significant role in reshaping international competition. The results indicate that terminal operating contracts have a significant impact on bilateral trade with China, while a completed port project will temporarily increase trade with the rest of the world (RoW).

Where Chinese firms operate ports, they appear to modify the host countries’ trade toward China and away from former trade partners. By contrast, infrastructure projects appear to bring temporary economic benefits to host economies that fade away about four years after completion. For the BRI’s trade network to function as a new development model, it would need to bring substantial benefits to host countries. While the BRI has generated extensive discussion and geopolitical debate, detailed analysis of its economic effects has been limited. At present, it remains uncertain whether the benefits of these relationships outweigh the risks, or if the new model of interconnectivity benefits host countries as much as they benefit China. 

These are not abstract matters, as Germany recently allowed Chinese state-owned shipping giant COSCO to take a significant stake in the port of Hamburg. An expansive presence in Mediterranean ports has also garnered substantial attention, as it could offer strategic advantages for China among growing tensions between Europe and Asia.

The Maritime Silk Road stretches further than its official footprint

China's reach extends far beyond the BRI’s official membership boundaries and is fortified by its prolific investment in overseas ports. This ambitious expansion fits within China’s broader global economic strategy. Although the official Maritime Silk Road (MSR) serves as a primary channel for international flows, additional port contracts with Chinese firms can be considered tributaries along a wider network of influence. Countries along this extended MSR can transact relatively easily with Chinese firms due to shared standards and practices along the supply chain.

The BRI’s stated objectives include policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds. This reduces uncertainty as well as the transaction costs of trade between partners, which can manifest as fees, commissions, insurances and legal expenses, along with the time required to procure these services. In a world increasingly interconnected by trade, transaction costs play a pivotal role in shaping economic relationships. 

China’s port activities influence Global Trade Networks

Our estimates suggest that this growing constellation of Chinese port activities has had a significant impact on total trade with China over the past 20 years. Typically, we see a trend towards more exports to China as control over terminal operation increases. This means that Chinese firms are buying a greater share of their goods from these countries than ever before. Furthermore, these results are not affected by a country's development status. Regardless of GDP per capita, the changes are significant and consistent.

All participation is not created equal. Investment projects, property acquisitions and operating agreements for port terminals by Chinese SAEs are not equivalent events. As the level of control at the port increases, total trade also increases with China. Port construction projects show a different pattern. As Chinese investment increases, so does trade with the rest of the world, at least temporarily. The statistically significant increases to total trade flows begin six years prior to completion and, on average, turn negative four years after completion. This suggests that trade increases may come from the surge in materials, equipment and project requirements to actually develop the terminal rather than a reduction in trade costs.

Unless a Chinese SAE is involved in port operations, there are no measurable long-term changes to trade flows after a port development project. This is surprising, as gains from trade are often the main motivation for large maritime infrastructure projects. However, there is evidence that the short-term increases to total trade during the time of construction do generate temporary economic benefits for host economies. 

Key findings from empirical analysis of Chinese port activities

A port contract with a Chinese firm does not predict an increase in trade between other members of the extended MSR. This implies that there is no significant reduction in costs between these trade partners and that cost savings are a result of a reduction in transaction barriers between host economies and Chinese markets. Pricing data would be needed to confirm whether host countries have shifted business away from low-cost providers, but trade flows indicate that trade is being diverted away from their former trade partners in favor of trade with Chinese firms.

• Total trade with China is expected to increase about 21 percent after a terminal operating contract is signed and exports to China usually increase more than imports.
• Expected increases are magnified if Chinese firms have a controlling interest in all terminals, in at least one port in the country. In these cases, over a 12-year period, exports to China would be expected to increase by 76 percent, whereas imports from China would be expected to increase by 36 percent.
• Host countries that allow Chinese firms to operate all terminals in at least one port saw a 19 percent reduction in exports to the rest of the world (RoW) during the analysis period.
• Chinese firms buy more goods than they sell to the host countries after operating agreements are signed and much of the cost savings go to the Chinese.
• There is no measurable effect on overall trade between other members of the trade network, regardless of whether China is included in the estimation.
• Completed infrastructure projects bring no significant long-term effects. Agreeing to and completing an infrastructure development project predicts a temporary increase in trade with all partners during the duration of a project, but these effects do not last.

These results indicate that hypothetically, a country could maximize the economic benefits of cooperation by allowing Chinese SAEs to operate one or two port terminals, while also negotiating regular maritime infrastructure development projects that diversify import and export partner during construction. However, this constellation omits the serious financial and geopolitical risks of unintended lock-in effects and challenges that can arise during long-term operating contracts. 

Geopolitical risks need consideration 

It would be too ambitious to claim that China is indeed giving the world a new model of international development, although it appears their maritime activities have certainly modified conditions in global markets. China’s network of SAEs acts as a quasi-supranational organization seeking to establish a global footprint. Host economies may gain from greater trade, increased commerce and cheaper goods but the price tag includes institutional lock-in and loss of diversity in trade partners.

For policymakers, the challenge is to find a balance between benefiting from economic interdependence and mitigating the hazards in a geopolitically unstable world. In the best-case scenario, any trade diversion would benefit network members by reducing total trade costs; however, in real terms, an undiversified supply chain is a national security risk. The more a country becomes economically dependent on another, the less agency it will have in making economic decisions. Caution is advisable.
 

China’s privileged SOEs are well entrenched in European ports and shipping

Host countries face risks and opportunities to their overall economy from Chinese SOEs owning or operating ports. MERICS and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies conducted a risk assessment of Chinese investments in European maritime infrastructure for the European Parliament. We found some cyber and data risks, and minor potential for more traditional ‘hard’ security concerns. Bringing in a foreign company can add a lot of value if the host country is unable to run ports efficiently and profitably because it lacks capable firms or government capacity. However, the shipping companies plying the port should feature in any proper risk assessment. In other words, you can’t talk about ports without also talking about shipping companies. 

We have reviewed the impact on regional markets of China’s global shipping giant COSCO and two of its major port companies - China Merchants Group (CMG) and COSCO Ports. We describe their activities in the Mediterranean and Northern European shipping markets below. CMG, COSCO Ports, and COSCO ownership and funding carry distinctive risks, which should be understood to appreciate their impact on regional networks. This section excludes Hong Kong-based port operator Hutchinsons (which is covered elsewhere in this report) because of its status as a private firm and its limited integration into the protected home market in Mainland China as well as the SOE vertically integrated value chain issues discussed below. 

CMG, COSCO Ports, and COSCO can build market share in unfair ways

One of the chief risks that can emerge in a shipping network is dependency on a key external player. In a simplified example: 

• If Country-A depends on port operators and shipping companies from Country-B to handle the bulk of its trade, then Country-A is dependent on Country-B for its prosperity, and maybe even for critical supply chains of goods it cannot produce. 
• If Country-A can also turn to Country-C for those services, it has less dependency risk. Dependency risks fall further if Country-A can also turn to D, E, and F. 
• However, if Country-B’s shipping companies hold 50 percent of regional shipping market share, while countries C, D, E, F, and G’s companies hold 10 percent each, then Country-B has considerable power as Country-A has little chance of replacing B’s shipping services in a crisis. 

Market share is a good metric to measure the risk of dependency, where an actor’s dominant share could not be readily replaced by others. In the competition for market share, China’s SOEs benefit from three critical advantages over their European counterparts. 

First, COSCO, CMG, and COSCO Ports are all owned (directly or through a parent company) by a body that is directly under China’s State Council, namely the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). They do not have a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders and their sole stakeholder can and does assign them strategic roles on a regular basis. Beijing also directs a wide range of state aid to SASAC-owned SOEs to support them in achieving national goals. This does not mean that firms like COSCO never act on commercial terms. In fact, the bulk of COSCO’s operations may well be driven by market forces. But at any moment, Beijing may mandate non-commercial goals. 
 

If Beijing sought to make a country’s trade more dependent on COSCO, it could mandate shipping rates at lower margins, or even below profitability, to build market share, which could be weaponized at a later date. If Berlin tried to do this through Hapag-Lloyd, the company could ignore the government: it would need shareholder approval to abandon profitability to build market share at a loss. 

Second, SASAC-owned firms’ value chains include many similar SOEs, which can empower them to undercut market prices. CMG and COSCO Ports get state aid, while benefitting from state aid given to other Chinese SOEs in their value chain. If Beijing pushes CMG to build or expand a given port, it can do so with many friendly suppliers passing along state aid in favorable prices. For instance, CMG can depend on SOE construction giants like China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) or its subsidiary China Harbour Engineering Company who can source materials from SOE steelmakers like Baosteel, or harbor cranes from CCCC subsidiary Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited. Project finance would almost certainly come from China’s state-run banks along the whole supply chain. 

COSCO occupies a similar position in a heavily-state-run value chain (see chart below), which creates competitive advantages for China’s port operators and shipping companies – they bring their own massive scale and much of China Inc’s too. Market economies with robust anti-trust laws would not allow SASAC’s vertically-integrated value chains to develop in their own jurisdictions: EU and Danish anti-trust and competition law would dismantle MAERSK promptly if it were one entity owned by a holding company that also owned many of its suppliers and customers. But European rules that rightly hold back local firms do nothing to hold back Chinese ones, either because regulators fail to see SASAC for what it is, or only interact with limited parts of a given value chain (e.g., like having market contact with COSCO, but not its suppliers). 

Third, Chinese shipping companies enjoy a protected home market, yet open access to European networks. Chinese firms can do more in European ports than European firms can do in China, which changes the value-proposition of port-ownership and operation. European shipping companies can only perform direct international shipping services in China (see chart below). They are excluded from transshipping or domestic/inland shipping services in China, even through local subsidiaries. Meanwhile, COSCO can provide all kinds of shipping services in Europe. For transshipping, COSCO must route between different EU members states - not a big challenge given the close proximity of such major ports as Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Antwerp, all in different countries. COSCO does need a local subsidiary to do domestic/inland shipping, which it has in COSCO (Europe) and another unit called The Diamond Line. 

These three advantages skew the pitch in favor of China’s port operators and shipping companies seeking market share. As a result, they have penetrated European shipping networks deeply and are expanding their reach.

Piraeus and Rotterdam: China Inc’s port networks in southern and northern Europe 

The Port of Piraeus serves as COSCO’s major transshipping hub in the Mediterranean and Black Sea markets. Majority owned and operated by COSCO, which has expanded it over the years, the port’s ‘hub and spoke’ operations transfer cargo from COSCO’s huge long-haul container ships onto smaller ‘feeder’ vessels sailing to many smaller ports. Feeders also bring China-bound containers to Piraeus for vessels returning to China. 

The scale of transshipping through Piraeus creates dependencies across the region but most acutely in Greece itself because the port supports so many jobs, directly and indirectly. If COSCO were to shift its trade flows elsewhere, there would be no market demand for other shipping companies to fill – the port is effectively an artificial miracle purely because COSCO determined to make it its own hub. Beijing also aspires to use Piraeus to send goods inland by rail through the Western Balkans into Central Europe, though these ‘intermodal’ ambitions have yet to fully materialize.

The Port of Rotterdam, where COSCO owns 35 percent of one terminal and CMG owns 14.7 percent of another, gives is a more direct access point to European customers through intermodal connections with barges on the Rhine, plus railways and highways. COSCO (Europe) and Diamond Line have some of this intermodal market, though it is unclear how successful their efforts have been – COSCO’s investment in the inland Port of Duisburg seems to have failed as it divested in late 2022. 

Chinese players hold stakes in the broader English Channel/North Sea region that amplify their Rhine Delta foothold: COSCO owns 85 percent of a terminal in Zeebrugge, Belgium, and 24.9 percent of an Antwerp terminal jointly with CMG. The latter also has minority stakes in three terminals in Northern France: Terminal des Flandres (44.6 percent), Terminal De France and Terminal Nord (24.5 percent), and Terminal Du Grande Ouest (24.5 percent). 

While CMG and COSCO have significant leverage in Northern Europe, it is more diffuse than in Piraeus. Nor do they have the same leverage. The immense natural demand for the Rhine Delta and English Channel as gateways to the EU market means many rivals would willingly take over COSCO’s capacity if it were to cease services there. 

COSCO and CMG’s unfair advantages and hidden support to capture market share and build dependencies apply to China’s expansion everywhere within global maritime infrastructure and shipping networks. However, the differing regional networks radiating from Piraeus and Rotterdam suggest how circumstances should be factored into mitigating risks and distortions on the common market stemming from the issues outlined above. The next chapter develops this theme with a deeper look at the specifics and dynamics of several ports, their surrounding networks, China’s aspirations for each port and whether those wishes have succeeded. 
 

Beijing gains and loses traction along the Maritime Silk Road

In Europe, large contracts with Chinese firms provide a network of influence, although formal BRI affiliations at the national level are few and its influence is quickly declining in countries that signed MOUs. Not every Chinese port presence is officially part of the MSR. Nonetheless they link into a wider network that appears to reshape trade flows. Therefore, market penetration by Chinese firms is still a win for Beijing, even if the contract is only Belt and Road adjacent, as favorable conditions for investment returns still benefit the broader objectives of the CCP. 

Over the past 20 years, three main strategies have been favored to expand China’s influence in foreign ports. The first is ‘project-then-operate,’ Chinese SOEs come in with a project, then leverage it into a bigger concession that has greater control of the terminal. The second is ‘operate-then-project’ where a Chinese firm wins a port operating concession or buys into a consortium. From here, it builds up the port by developing the terminal(s) to increase throughput. The third strategy is ‘under-new-management,’ as seen in the CCP’s growing influence over the vast assets of Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Holdings. Although Hutchison remains a private enterprise operating out of Hong Kong, growing influence from Beijing and the eroding autonomy of the HKSAR makes it increasingly difficult to determine the degree of independence that HK-based firms have when their operations overlap with Beijing's strategic goals. 

The Mediterranean is a unique waypoint on the extended MSR in that agreements are predominantly acquisitions, or operating contracts rather than development deals. Chinese SAEs have signed significant contracts at 18 ports in 11 countries with varying degrees of success; however, only 4 of them could be classified as ‘project-then-operate’ and 1 of them (El Hamdania Port in Cherchell, Algeria) is indefinitely suspended. Of the other 3, only 1 turned into an operating contract and that project has not panned out as expected (SIPG Bayport Terminal in Haifa, Israel). Although the BRI has been losing ground in some regions, Chinese SAEs can still be positioned for favorable investment returns. Even in the cases where large projects did not transform into operating contracts (Bulk Cargo Terminal in Port of Ploče, Croatia and Main Terminal in the Port of Ashdod, Israel), Chinese SAEs make millions of dollars on the construction.

Mapping the waypoints on the Belt and Road

The situational matrix below illustrates our assessment of successful efforts to penetrate Mediterranean port markets using two measures of effectiveness for Chinese maritime holdings. The first is a measure of commercial potential in the market; the second measure weighs up strategic success. A market is considered favorable if Chinese firms serve large markets, own larger percentages of operating companies, operate larger terminals, manage more containers, execute profitable projects and require less development investment. If these conditions are coupled with support for the BRI, it is smooth sailing for Chinese firms.

In places where the BRI has become less popular, the same conditions require some adaptive navigation to be successful. As the amount of investment increases, or the amount of throughput decreases the ability to earn returns will experience some headwinds, even in favorable pro-BRI terrain. If the BRI has fallen out of favor, or Chinese firms were unable to get a foothold in the market, those same headwinds will lead to rough waters for Chinese investments and geopolitical ties with Beijing.

Smooth sailing in Egypt

Egypt is a great example of favorable investment conditions under favorable conditions for the BRI. In 2007, China Shipping Group invested USD 40 million for a 20 percent share in Port Damietta, which can handle 2.5 million 20-foot-equivalent [container] units (TEUS) per year. About 70 kilometers up the coast is Port Said, where COSCO invested USD 186 million in 2005 to acquire 20 percent of the Suez Canal Container Terminal, which can handle about 3.5 million TEUS per year. This is as a result of China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) investing USD 219 million to construct a new quay. In this constellation, Chinese SAEs exert 20 percent control over some 6 million TEUS a year, creating an impact score of 1.2 TIPS (TEU Influence at Ports). TIPS are calculated by multiplying the capacity of the terminal in millions (6 TEUS) by the percentage of ownership or ownership of an operating consortium (20 percent).

In 2016, Hutchison purchased a 30 percent share in Alexandria International Container Terminals Company for an undisclosed amount. The consortium owns terminals at Port Alexandria and Port El Dekheila that have been wholly operated by Hutchison since 2005, with combined annual TEUS of 1.5 million. As Hutchison is the sole operator, all TEUS are added to the impact score bringing the total influence in Egypt to 2.7 TIPS. 

In 2020, Hutchison signed a USD 700 million deal to build additional capacity at Alexandria and new cargo terminal at Abu Qir Naval Base. In total, Chinese firms have invested over USD 1.5 billion to grow their presence in Egyptian ports, with little international attention. Media reports tend to focus on failed projects, or China’s pervasive network in Greece. Egypt is an enthusiastic supporter of the BRI, and its armed forces appear to be embracing Hutchison as a partner. If these trends continue uninterrupted, Egypt may eventually surpass Greece as China’s Mediterranean gem.

Adaptive navigation in Italy

Even when the BRI is losing traction, strategic investments in maritime holdings will hold their ground. Earlier this year, Italy signaled plans to leave the BRI, not long after officially joining in 2019. The about turn is generally ascribed to EU and US “de-risking” campaigns to curb dependence on China. Italy’s plans had already suffered setbacks but pulling out of the BRI meant losing millions in earmarked port upgrades and infrastructure development. Rome’s decision was bad geopolitical news for Beijing, but it does not affect the good investments already made by Chinese SAEs.

With some adaptive navigation, COSCO and Qingdao Port International can still flourish at Port Vado Ligure. In 2016 APM Terminals sold them a 40 percent and 9.9 percent share of Reefer and Deepwater Container Terminals respectively. The terminals at Vado Ligure contain the largest refrigerated cargo facility on the Mediterranean Sea and now have the ability to accommodate Ultra-Large Container Ships (ULCS) of up to 19,000 TEUS capacity. This strategic advantage will be left unaffected by the changing tides of support for the official BRI and Chinese firms are still positioned to see a return on their investments.

The Vado Ligure acquisition cost only USD 53 million, but the consortium has spent around USD 500 million developing a new deepwater terminal that increased annual TEUS to 1.3 million. This means that despite losing ground in the geopolitical arena, Chinese firms will still have an impact score of 0.6 TIPS. As a result, there is still plenty of room for commercial success. 

Strong headwinds in Turkey

This is a project that has a lot of support from the BRI but where returns are constrained by large investments and smaller throughputs. In 2015, COSCO, China Merchants and China Investment Corporation formed Consortium SPV and paid USD 920 million for a 64.5 percent share of Kumport Terminal. The project’s geopolitical significance was underscored when Presidents Recep Erdogan and Xi Jinping both attended the signing. 

Although this was a big win for Beijing, the project will face strong headwinds as can be seen when comparing the conditions to Egypt. Chinese firms have invested around USD 1.5 billion for access to terminals in both the Mediterranean and in the Suez Canal and in return are involved in the handling of over 10 million TEUS. In Turkey, there has been about USD 1 billion in investment, but Kumport Terminal only manages about 1.3 million TEUS and offers an impact score of 0.8 TIPS. 

Kumport Terminal’s reported capacity was 1.4 million TEUS in 2014 and even after a number of completed upgrades is still operating below those levels. The terminal is currently running at about 60 percent of total capacity with high investment costs. For Beijing, the inflated costs of moving into the neighborhood are outweighed by a strategic position between Europe and the Middle East. The project undoubtedly has the potential to create stable financial returns in the long run. 

Rough waters in Israel

This is a good example of the best laid plans going awry. In 2015, Shanghai International Port Group signed a contract to develop a deepwater terminal in Port Haifa. This was one of the few times that Chinese firms attempted to use the ‘project-then-operate' model to enter a Mediterranean market. Although it was clear from the beginning that this USD 1.7 billion investment was intended to be a tip on the spear of broader involvement, significant pressure from the US and EU led stakeholders to explore other options. 

Despite a significant investment in the new adjacent terminal, Chinese firms lost the bid to purchase and operate the entire port. A consortium led by India’s Adani group completed the purchase in early 2023 for about USD 1.2 million. Shanghai International Port Group found itself left with a 25-year management contract at a port it had funded and developed. Both the Chinese and Indian firms paid above market value, underscoring that not all wins are financial. 

Given growing concerns over Chinas expanding network influence, enthusiasm for the BRI is losing ground in Israel; however, unlike in Italy, the premium paid for expansion may be difficult to service. The Haifa Bayport Terminal can only process around 1 million TEUS per year. Although there are rough waters ahead the project is not a total loss. Chinese firms completed the construction and have established a strategic foothold in the region. Despite the heavy price per TIP, its strategic position is still a win for China in the broader market for influence.
 

The BRI will evolve to become greener and tech focused

Xi’s keynote speech to the Third Belt and Road Forum in October 2023 signaled the BRI will continue to adapt. His sentiments were then echoed in the ten year plan for the future of the BRI the following month. Extensive language suggested projects would become smaller scale, more financially sustainable, and more focused on facilitating trade and greenfield investment. Furthermore, Xi emphasized the importance of softer dimensions of connectivity now that hard infrastructure is in place. 

Xi’s speech may have contained a subtle admission that his signature foreign policy initiative has not always generated results that enhance Beijing’s interests and reputation. Some BRI projects were too large for the recipient country, the debt proved too great for others, or systems that could use finished projects efficiently were neglected. However, the BRI has advanced the party-state’s goals in ways that far exceed any defaults or criticism by foreign partners.

Port projects have done much to promote Beijing’s interests and enhance China’s economic security. Access to raw materials - from soybeans to iron, lithium and cobalt – is more certain, as are transport links to growth markets for China’s exports. COSCO has been able to grow its market share more readily alongside the global web of ports wholly or part-owned or operated by Chinese entities. Equally, the BRI has boosted Chinese rail companies, energy firms and oil and gas players. All have new footholds in emerging markets, and a bigger global footprint, making Beijing more influential and secure. 

However, there is a limited viable demand for even more traditional infrastructure. In the future, priority will be given to sectors with more pent up demand and where China’s national champions urgently need new or expanded markets. The outcome may well fill in the gaps and shortcomings that continue to hold back projects built in the BRI’s first decade. 

Traditional BRI infrastructure projects need better systems and skills 

The first need is for more streamlined systems connecting projects across borders and smoothing customs checks. Physical infrastructure such as expanded mining operations, railways to ship out the ore and port facilities to load it are less valuable with poor linkages and administrative delays. Improving such intermodal connections is likely to become a core task for officials advancing the BRI. 

This problem is evident along the “Middle Corridor” which runs from China through Central Asia then crosses either the Caucuses or Turkey to Europe. It requires at least one sea crossing of the Caspian and possibly a second at the Black Sea, depending on a given cargo’s destination. For smooth transitions between rail, road and water, the route needs efficient physical infrastructure as well as good alignment between customs, trade, tax, and safety authorities in China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the EU when goods finally enter its common market. 

Xi’s speech suggested Beijing will work to fill vital skills gaps while simultaneously countering critics in host countries and extending its social influence. Maximizing the benefits of BRI infrastructure requires the right personnel. Beijing has taken a lot of flak for the abundance of imported Chinese workers on BRI projects and lack of local job-creation. Xi stressed stronger people-to-people ties, 100,000 new training opportunities for green development and ongoing support for the Silk Road Scholarship program. 

A quick glance through the application pages of Chinese universities participating in the scholarship shows the program’s ambition: all types of mechanical and electrical engineering and computer science are offered, as are technical focuses on oil and natural gas extraction, mining and metallurgical engineering. The overwhelming emphasis is on STEM programs though there are also Chinese language programs with a focus on translation skills. 

China pitches itself as the global south’s partner for the green and digital transitions 

We can also expect the BRI will shift towards fields where China’s national champions hold strong positions and shield them from unwelcome new pressures. 

Xi’s speech highlighted China’s quest for a green BRI. The BRI became notorious in its first decade for building coal-fired power plants. However, China’s own green energy story is likely to be replicated overseas, not least because of overcapacity. By the end of 2023, China is expected to producing twice as many PV panels as global demand can absorb. In EV batteries, China is on track to exceed current demand from vehicle makers by four times, and its output of finished EVs is similarly in need of buyers. As these are key growth industries that align with national ambitions, China’s local and provincial governments have been piling in with state aid to ensure their local player wins the long race. This has prevented market consolidation, a trend that is likely to persist as long as the national and local directives do. It brings pressure to export excess capacity in ways that undercuts prices. The BRI will likely be a platform to facilitate exports of that overcapacity, using green energy projects to stimulate demand overseas. 

Meanwhile, telecoms infrastructure giants like Huawei and ZTE are likely to become increasingly reliant on the ‘Digital Silk Road’ as more developed economies impose restrictions on Chinese involvement in building their 5G networks. As China completes the bulk of its own 5G network, the pressure to find alternative revenue streams will grow. The outcome may be to accelerate upgrades or roll outs in the global south on favorable terms from China Inc. As Huawei and ZTE play central roles in Beijing’s tech self-reliance strategy, there are strong imperatives to secure markets so they have steady revenue streams to fund their R&D. 

Competing with an evolving BRI and China Inc’s changing global footprint 

Now the EU’s Global Gateway has technically launched its first projects, there is a need to do some serious strategizing about its relationship with the BRI. An essential consideration is the need for a framework to determine which BRI projects should be competed with, or collaborated on, and which should not. To that end, the forthcoming editions of this tracker will continue to map out China Inc’s global footprint, including in the BRI’s traditional and newly emerging spheres, and consider the questions facing Europe around competition with China in third markets.