TIBET – Tracking Dissent on the High Plateau: Communications technology on the Gormo-Lhasa Railway...[Nortel]
Table of Contents
The Research Team
Summary
Preparation of the Case Study
Scoping
Human rights in principle
Research on the Investment
The company
The contract
Dual-use technology
Military implications
Railway communications as part of China’s Golden Shield project
Home state involvement
Adapting the Methodology to the Case Study
Outcomes of the Site visit Research
The human right to security of the person
The human right to privacy
The human right to freedom of expression
The human right to self-determination (respect for national sovereignty)
The human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
The human right to development (economic, social and cultural rights)
The human right to be free from discrimination
Conclusions and Recommendations
• Recommendations
– For the company
– For the Government of Canada
Credits
The Research Team
Researchers in Tibet and China
Un-named for security reasons
Technical advisor
Greg Walton, UK
Special thanks to:
Members of the International Tibet Support Network (economic rights working group);
Antonio José Almeida, Legal advisor, Rights & Democracy, and Amy Zhang, Intern, Rights & Democracy
Summary
In March 2005, the Canadian company Nortel announced it had entered into an agreement with China’s Ministry of Railways to provide a digital wireless communications network for a new railway being built in Tibet. The railway, with Nortel’s technology, became operational in July 2006. It now stretches 1,118 km from the city of Gormo to Lhasa, Tibet’s capital. Many Tibetans object to the railway because they believe it will consolidate the Chinese presence in Tibet, a presence that has been characterized by systemic human rights abuse.
The technology provided by Nortel, called the Global System for Mobile Communications for Railways, is a key component in the railway’s communication system. Railway communication systems are themselves part of China’s Golden Shield Project, an all-encompassing surveillance network that links national, regional and local security agencies, thereby improving the state’s efficiency in monitoring and controlling the flow of information and people.
To collect field data for this case study, researchers in Tibet and China focused on the general context in which the investment would take place. As the only ex-ante study in the human rights impact assessment project, the results of their research differ in nature from the results produced in the other studies where the projects were operational when the research took place. This study limits its scope to the identification of potential future impacts of the proposed investment project based on the general context and actual situation in the project location.
The case study raises important considerations related to corporate complicity within public-private partnerships, particularly in non-democratic states where human rights violations are systemic. It concludes that because dual-use technology will be shared with the Government of China through this investment project, the company and the home state (Canada) have an obligation to apply controls and safeguards aimed specifically at the protection of human rights in Tibet.
Preparation of the Case Study
Scoping
The history of Tibet can be traced back to the early 7th century when various tribes and clans who lived on the high plateau united as a confederation. Through the centuries, the Tibetan people have maintained a shared identity and territory, although a central authority has not always existed.
In 1949, Chinese troops entered eastern Tibet claiming to bring modernization while offering guarantees that internal governance and cultural and religious systems would remain under Tibetan administration. These guarantees of autonomy quickly proved illusory. In March 1959, following a series of protests and rallies, Chinese forces suppressed an uprising in which more than 10,000 people died. The Dalai Lama and some 80,000 followers fled across the Himalayas and were given sanctuary by the Government of India. It is estimated that since 1959, approximately 1.2 million Tibetans have died as a result of the Chinese occupation, either through harsh prison conditions, summary execution or starvation. Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama has campaigned for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. He has received several international peace awards for his efforts, including the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.
Before the People’s Republic of China became a member of the United Nations in 1971, the General Assembly passed three resolutions in support of the Tibetan people, citing various violations to their fundamental rights and freedoms, including their right to self-determination.1 In 1991, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minority Rights (now the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights) passed a resolution expressing concern at the continued violation of the human rights of the Tibetan people.
Today, the status of Tibet as an autonomous region within China is protected by national legislation entitled the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy. This law, revised in 2001, is meant to implement a system of regional autonomy based on constitutional provisions that allow for the creation of administrative regions with their own governance systems. The law includes the right to enjoy self-government, to manage internal affairs, to formulate separate regulations, to protect language and religious freedoms, and to independently manage economic development.2 Theoretically, it enables autonomous areas, including Tibet, to enact local legislation and to modify state laws and policies in the interests of local priorities and needs. In practice, these rights are not used, possibly because they must be approved by the Standing Committee of the National Peoples’ Congress or because state ministries enjoy an effective veto which is not part of the law. Further, the law does not permit actions deemed “harmful to the state”.3
In addition to national laws, there are a number of regulations that apply specifically to the Tibet Autonomous Region and the other autonomous prefectures that are part of historical Tibet. These include regulations designed to enhance the role of women and workers, and to manage the environment and natural resources. In practice however, efforts to apply affirmative action policies based on these regulations would likely be viewed as controversial by authorities because of a general distrust of Tibetans and the role of the Party at all levels of policy development and implementation.
Despite increasing prosperity across China, poverty continues to plague the majority of Tibetans. According to the United Nations Development Program, Tibet is the poorest and least developed region of China. This disparity is not merely regional but takes on an ethnic dimension when looking at Tibetan and Chinese populations within Tibet itself, where discriminatory social and fiscal policies have entrenched a two-class social and economic system. In was in this context that in June 1999, Chinese President Jiang Zemin announced a vague new program entitled China’s Western Development Strategy (sometimes referred to as the Go-West Campaign), describing it as a means to strengthen national unity, safeguard social stability, and consolidate border defence.4 To be successful, the strategy required an ambitious plan of infrastructure development and foreign investment.
Human rights in principle
The People’s Republic of China became a member of the United Nations in November 1971, replacing Taiwan and occupying a seat on the UN Security Council. Since then, the government of China has ratified more than 20 human rights treaties, including five of the seven core human rights treaties: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1980; the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 1981; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1988; the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1992; and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2001. In addition, China has signed, but not ratified, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.
China regularly submits reservations when it ratifies treaties, meaning that it does not accept all obligations included in the documents. For example, China maintains a reservation with regard to labour rights protected in Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and similarly it has withdrawn from provisions for monitoring procedures contained in Article 20 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Despite the ratifications however, the domestic status of international treaties remains unclear. Although the Government of China explicitly recognized human rights in its constitution in 2004, this does not have the same implication for domestic legislation as it does in countries where the constitution is a legal document rather than a statement of principles. Moreover, China argues that international law does not apply to individuals but only to states. It therefore continues to emphasize the principle of non-interference in internal affairs whenever questions about its domestic human rights compliance are raised. Nevertheless, in its relations with western agencies and other governments, the Government of China talks about human rights and this discourse is reflected in the release of numerous White Papers published since 1991.
The UN treaty bodies – committees that monitor State Party compliance with various human rights treaties – have issued reports that include specific mention of the situation in Tibet. Most recently, in 2006, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reviewed China for the first time. It noted with concern “reports regarding the discrimination of ethnic minorities by the State party, in particular in the fields of employment, adequate standard of living, health, education and culture”.5 Such observations point to the exclusion of Tibetans from their own development process.
Tibet
The word Tibet is often used in reference to the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. In fact, the autonomous region comprises only one administrative region of the three that comprised historical Tibet. The western mountainous parts of present-day Sichuan, with the northwestern tip of Yunnan, once made up the Tibetan province of Kham (Dhomey), while most of Qinghai, with a western part of Gansu, was once known as the Tibetan province of Amdo (Dhotoe). Most of what comprises the present day Tibet Autonomous Region was formerly known as Central Tibet (U-Tsang) prov ince. With a population of about 2.6 million,6 the Tibet Autonomous Region includes only about half of the total ethnic Tibetan population in China and it does not include many of the regions of historical Tibet.7 For the purposes of this report, the word Tibet will be used in its broader sense and Tibet Autonomous Region will indicate only central Tibet. This report uses location names in Tibetan-English transliteration.
Research on the Investment
The railway from Gormo to Lhasa is a flagship project of China’s Western Development Strategy. The railway was originally conceived during the 1950s, but it wasn’t until 1994 that surveys and feasibility studies were conducted. The total length of the track is 1,118 km, of which more than 960 km is at or above 4,000 metres above sea level. More than 560 km of track is built on permafrost. The railway travels across a vast untouched plateau from Gormo, once the centre of the Tibetan salt trade and now a bustling Chinese city, over the Tungla Pass and through Nagchu and Damshung to Lhasa, Tibet’s capital city.
Many Tibetans object to the railway because they believe it is a political project aimed at quelling dissent in the restive region. A secret 1970 report released in 1993 by the Government of the United States cited the lack of a railway as the primary reason why Beijing had so far failed to fully assimilate Tibet into China.8 Tibetans argue that the railway will facilitate the movement of military troops into and within the region, that it will encourage the influx of Chinese entrepreneurs and workers eventually making Tibetans a minority in their own land, and that it will provide the infrastructure needed to export Tibet’s resource riches to the industrialized eastern regions of China.9
The first train arrived in Lhasa on July 1st 2006, after research for this report was completed. An official opening ceremony took place under heavy security. At the ceremony, the chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Champa Phunstok, dismissed allegations about the purposes of the railway, telling assembled dignitaries and western journalists that the central government would not deal with Tibet’s government-in-exile unless the Dalai Lama conceded that both Tibet and Taiwan have always been part of China.10
Authorities have since announced that three new extensions to the railway will be constructed: one to Nepal via Shigatse; one to the Indian border at Nyalam in Sikkim; and one to southeast China via Chengdu.
The company
Nortel is a Canadian company, headquartered in Brampton, Ontario. It develops and manufactures communications and information technology and in 2005, reported more than US $18 billion in total assets and more than US $10 billion in sales.11 Nortel’s 35,370 employees12 work in Canada, the US, Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean and Asia.13 By the end of 2005, Nortel had helped install more than 300 wireless networks in more than 50 countries.14
In the 1990s, the internet revolution presented an opportunity for the company to shift its focus from telecommunications equipment to information technology. By 1998, more than 75% of internet traffic in North America was carried on Nortel’s high-performance optical networks.15 The end of the dot-com boom however signalled the beginning of financial and legal troubles for Nortel. Its stock plummeted and its workforce was cut in half.16 Between 2001 and 2004, Nortel and certain of its former officers and directors were named as defendants in 27 class action lawsuits in the US and Canada.17 In 2005, the company agreed to pay US shareholders US $2.25 billion. The Canadian suits have yet to be settled.18 At the end of 2005, Nortel reported a loss of US $2.6 billion.
Despite Nortel’s shaky performance on the home front, it has steadily increased its presence in emerging markets, especially in China, where it has two research and development centres and four manufacturing plants.19 Nortel has won a series of contracts to construct, expand or provide equipment for telecommunications networks in China.20 They include deals with China Railcom, a national telecommunications operator; SINOPEC, China’s largest producer and marketer of oil products; and PetroChina, a subsidiary of the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation.21
Nortel has said that it is not collaborating with any government to repress human rights and that it has contributed to communities in the form of donations and technology training programs.22 However, at the annual general meeting of Nortel shareholders on June 29th 2006, the Vancouver-based Ethical Fund submitted a resolution proposing that the company prepare a report about its policies with respect to human rights in China and Tibet, and that it cooperate with a human rights impact assessment of its investment in Tibet. Nortel’s board of directors recommended, in a written statement to shareholders, that they vote against the resolution.23 The resolution nevertheless received 32% of votes cast.24
The contract
In 2001, Nortel announced that it had concluded a deal to provide China Railcom with a nationwide, multiservice ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) backbone network. ATM is a cell relay, circuit-switching network and data link protocol that encodes data traffic into small fixed-sized units. It facilitates the connection of two end-points before any data has been exchanged between them. The agreement included provision of both equipment and services.
China Railcom (formerly the China Railway Communication Co.) was transferred to state ownership in January 2004 and is one of the six primary telecommunication service providers in China.25 China Railcom is now administered by China’s Ministry of Railways and enjoys related preferential policies.26 On March 16th 2005, Nortel announced its contract with China’s Ministry of Railways to provide a digital wireless communications network for the Gormo-Lhasa railway. According to the Nortel press release, it would be the first commercial use in China of the Global System for Mobile Communications for Railways (GSM-R).27 The contract followed a year-long trial of the technology by Nortel China’s research and development team along 186 km of the track. Deployment required three types of sub-systems: the base stations (towers), the mobile stations (on board the train) and the network subsystem.
Nortel has denied that this contract constitutes an investment, but the provision of services within the contract, coupled with the company’s substantial commercial presence in China, would likely characterize it as investment under international law.
Dual-use technology
China’s Ministry of Railways assigned researchers at Beijing Jiaotong University with the task of developing an overarching management and planning system for the railway. The researchers designed what they call the G3 system, integrating Nortel’s GSM-R with a Geographic Information System and a Global Positioning System to create a new standard for railway communications.
The Geographic Information System (GIS) is a suite of software and hardware tools designed to combine relational databases with satellite maps of the earth’s surface. For rail transportation applications, spatial data which graphically represents the geometry of the rail network is visually cross-referenced with related attributes, for example, the location of bridges, stations and rolling stock, or socio-economic data to support decision making.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite navigation system operated by the United States Department of Defence. It consists of a constellation of 24 satellites orbiting the earth and six ground stations. The satellites transmit a signal that allows the user to determine with some accuracy the precise location of their GPS receiver. GPS receivers are accurate to within less than 15 metres.
The G3 system integrates these three technologies (GIS + GPS + GSM-R) to create a state-of-the-art information planning system for the railway. Nortel’s GSM-R system provided Beijing Jiaotong University with all the services it required to successfully deploy the G3 system: remote train control, voice communications for all users, emergency call handling, data message exchange, communication recording, and integration capacity with other existing (or future) systems. Once integrated, the G3 system provides, in the words of its engineers, “an extremely accurate location-tracking system”.28
Military implications
There is a reasonable expectation that the Gormo-Lhasa railway and the communications technology that supports it, will result in the permanent militarization of the Tibetan plateau. The Jamestown Foundation, a US-based think-tank, says that the Tibet railway will provide, “previously unrealized strategic, tactical, and conventional possibilities for the People’s Liberation Army to direct military firepower toward South Asia and beyond”.29 Journalists invited to travel on the first train in July 2006 reported that military camps and bases were seen along the tracks and that convoys of military vehicles were often visible, even though much of the route was uninhabited.30 The Military Area Commands of the Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province and the Qinghai Armed Police Force have reportedly deployed up to 10,000 soldiers and civilians along the route of the railway and according to media reports, their tactical communications are supported by Nortel’s GSM-R technology.31
In the name of national security, governments are turning increasingly toward security and surveillance technologies that are often derived from hi-tech, military research programs originally designed to track the movement of troops on the battlefield. These surveillance and C4I technologies (command, control, communication, computers and intelligence) cover a wide range of components, subsystems, products and software. They are used by the military, law enforcement, and emergency services, but also by commercial and private organizations. (The term C4I generally refers to military and police systems while civilian systems are more commonly referred to as information and communication technologies.) Most civilian communications technologies have surveillance and control facilities that mirror and are derived from military applications.
Modern military, security and police organizations rely on sensors to yield intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and they use networks to integrate and share the information that is gathered. Once the sensors and networks are integrated, they collectively comprise what William Owens, former chief executive officer of Nortel, once called a “System of Systems”.32 The technology transfer that the Government of China is most actively seeking from Nortel and other western companies is precisely this – sensors, networks and the ability to integrate them. Sensors and networks are the key components for both modern-day security systems and modern-day warfare. While they are not in and of themselves weapons, they can be used as such when they are integrated and combined with real time, operational intelligence.
Beyond Tibet, the railway, its communications system and its planned extensions will form a key part of China’s new security infrastructure, with implications beyond the plateau to central Asia. Chinese Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan has said that East Turkestan (ch. Xinjiang) on Tibet’s northwest border will become China’s main source of energy in the next five to ten years.33 To counter any threat of insurgency, Chinese security forces have invested heavily in updating their command and control systems to ensure a rapid response to any protest. The Xinjiang military region has hosted a series of exercises in the Taklimakan Desert where it incorporated a C4I local area network in an area 1,000 km long, integrating intelligence, command and control, automated artillery fire support, airspace surveillance and control, and logistics re-supply. This has significant consequences for high-altitude “infowar” allowing security forces to rapidly respond to any perceived threat.34
None of this has been lost on India. A July 6th 2006 announcement that the Gormo-Lhasa railway would be extended to the Indian border for trade purposes prompted expressions of concern from India’s security experts. The retired joint director of India’s Federal Intelligence Bureau said that China would now be able to “monitor troop deployment and movement along the disputed border”. Military intelligence officials have reportedly objected to opening of the trade route based on security concerns.35 The Chinese army has intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) designed for rail transport.36 The railway thereby provides Beijing with the potential of operating missile trains, with hiding places across the plateau, and threatening India with ballistic weapons in the same way it currently threatens Taiwan.
Railway communications as part of China’s Golden Shield project
The railway and its communications systems will also have security and surveillance uses in Tibet itself. Railway communications are part of China’s Golden Shield, a project that links national, regional and local security and surveillance agencies. The Golden Shield is a gigantic online database, incorporating speech and face recognition, closed-circuit television, smart cards, credit records and internet surveillance, offering immediate access to the registration records of every citizen in China. It was the subject of a major study by Rights & Democracy in 2001.37 The Government of China has described the Golden Shield as a means of strengthening central police control and improving efficiency.
Surveillance systems can range from closed circuit television surveillance, to local, regional or national traffic control, and to global systems for the monitoring of telephone, internet and fax communication. Such systems have legitimate military, police and civilian uses but they also have inherent capabilities that facilitate human rights violations when unfettered by the checks and balances taken for granted in most democratic states. It is this state of the art technology and communications equipment that enables the security apparatus of a single-party state to identify and arrest human rights defenders, pro-democracy campaigners, trade union organizers and political dissidents.
In September 2001 Agence France-Presse reported that the Public Security Bureau had set up a closed-circuit television network along China’s national railway network. This surveillance system allows officers to compare the faces of the public against a central database. In October 2001, following trials of the system installed in Beijing station, China Railcom announced that it had placed an order with Nortel to build a nationwide data network, which presumably will carry the closed-circuit television images.38
The Public Security Bureau has built up a national data bank that records information and data on about 1.25 billion of China’s 1.3 billion people.39 Last year, 330,000 criminal cases, or 20 percent of the total, were broken with the help of the data bank and the internet. According to Beijing Youth Daily, the network allowed the police to apprehend 39 suspected criminals within five days. Today, rail passengers have to negotiate numerous checkpoints throughout Beijing station, a process likely to be replicated in stations across China and along the Tibet railway.
Home state involvement
The Government of Canada denies any involvement in the Tibet railway project, either through participation in negotiations between Nortel and the Chinese Ministry of Railways or through the provision of funding to the project.40 Similarly, Export Development Canada denied in 2001 that it had provided any support in terms of insurance or loan guarantees to any Canadian company interested in pursuing projects related to the Tibet railway.41
The Canadian government has, however, provided substantial support through its suite of trade promotion services to Canadian business, including to companies interested in investment opportunities in Tibet and specifically related to the information and communications technology or railway sectors.42 In addition, a series of high profile trade missions to China, one ministerial visit to Tibet, luncheons Canada hosted for senior Chinese officials, and conferences in both Canada and China promoted and endorsed China’s Western Development Strategy.43
Canada has also been one of the countries to provide training programs for Chinese engineers, specifically related to railway construction and operation on permafrost. Chinese Vice-Minister of Railways, Sun Yongfu, told journalists that Chinese experts “had been sent to Russia and Canada to study permafrost rail construction”.44
Numerous other memoranda of understanding and bilateral agreements have promoted co-operation, investment, and technology exchange between Canada and China. They include an agreement on science and technology, a memorandum of understanding on information and communication technology, and a 2005 memorandum of understanding on railway development. Researchers could not find a single reference to human rights concerns in any of these documents.
Privacy regulations prevented researchers from finding out whether Nortel had submitted its technology to Canada’s export control review process, which oversees the export of military and dual-use technologies. The Government of Canada maintains strict control over dual-use technologies and reviews them from a human rights perspective.45 However, any item that is not listed on the Export Control List would be exempted from the process. Although the current list includes telecommunications systems, equipment, components and sensors, there are interesting exceptions. For example, systems and modules or integrated circuits for information security are exempted from the dual-use category and some technologies are broken down into individual components for assessment.48
The Government of Canada is currently negotiating a Foreign Investment Protection Agreement with China based on a standard model.49 The agreement seeks to guarantee protection for Canadian investors, in part by defining dispute settlement processes. The model makes no reference human rights and provides no dispute settlement process for individuals or communities who might experience a human rights violation as a result of any particular investment project.
It is interesting to note here that the United States, in part to deal with concerns about economic development projects in Tibet, passed the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002. 50 Its provisions apply to the Export-Import Bank (export credit agency), the Trade and Development Agency, and other US entities. The act establishes a number of conditions to be met before projects in Tibet may proceed. For example, projects should be implemented only after a thorough assessment of the needs of the Tibetan people has been conducted, through field visits and interviews; be preceded by cultural and environmental impact assessments; neither provide incentive for, nor facilitate the transfer of ownership of Tibetan land or natural resources to non-Tibetans; be implemented by agencies prepared to use Tibetan as the working language of the projects.
Adapting the Methodology to the Case Study
The research team faced a number of challenges as it sought to apply the human rights impact assessment methodology in Tibet. This case study is fundamentally different in nature from the others because the research took place before the railway was operational. Whereas the other case studies in the project sought to identify the actual impact of operational projects, the Tibet case study placed greater emphasis on the collection of contextual information in order to identify the potential future impacts of the investment project.
There were other reasons that necessitated a substantive revision of the research methodology for this case study. The prevailing climate of fear meant that no single community was able to follow our process from beginning to end and it precluded an open and transparent site visit. The railway is 1,118 km in length and the impact of its communications technology will be felt far beyond communities located along the track. Communications technology itself is intangible, difficult to identify as a precise entity and has multiple purposes – civilian, police and military – that are difficult to separate from each other. Finally, Nortel did not agree to collaborate with the research and therefore we had no access to contract details or to the company’s perspective on the investment.
Nevertheless, during the site visit, researchers travelled the entire length of the railway and interviewed individuals in several communities along the way. In total, the research team interviewed more than 75 individuals over a three-week period. Among Tibetans, we spoke with monks, nuns, students, business people, taxi drivers, teachers, tour guides, shop owners, hotel workers, farmers, nomads, sex workers, beggars, employees of nongovernmental organizations and one Public Security Bureau official. Among Chinese, our conversations included railway workers, shoe shiners, taxi drivers, tour guides, sex workers, petty merchants, as well as one journalist and at least one government official. Security concerns prevented prolonged visits with any one community or group. We were constantly aware of the threat to the personal security of our sources and guides and therefore exercised a good deal of restraint in pursuing sensitive lines of questioning. We documented no names and took no photos of anyone interviewed.
Before and after the site visit, we collected data from external sources including media reports and academic studies, and we conducted interviews within the Tibetan refugee communities in India, Nepal, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, as well as with western journalists in China, with Chinese activists in Hong Kong, and with representatives of nongovernmental organizations who were campaigning against the railway during the time of our research.
We would note here that despite numerous efforts by Rights & Democracy since 2005 to engage Nortel in this case study research, the company has consistently refused to participate. We contacted chief ethics and compliance officer, Susan Shepard, in August 2005 and subsequently invited her to participate in a seminar on the export of surveillance technology to China in October 2005. Later, Nortel’s vice-president for international relations, William Neil, informed us by telephone that Nortel would not participate either in the seminar or in this research. We requested the response in writing but never received it.
In May 2006, Rights & Democracy sent a formal letter addressed to Mr. Neil, describing the preliminary findings of our site visit to Tibet and requesting a meeting to discuss them. On June 12th 2006 we received an email communication from Richard Dipper of Nortel, promising a response before June 23rd 2006. On June 23rd 2006, we received a second email from Mr. Dipper, again declining to participate in the project. Rights & Democracy then suggested that even without formal collaboration on the research, Nortel might agree to answer specific questions related to its investment in Tibet. There was no response and no further communication, despite our leaving phone messages which were not returned.
Outcomes of the Site visit Research
The research guide requests two types of data when looking at the enjoyment of human rights in the project area: general context and actual impact. For this case study, because the site visit research took place before the railway was operational, the emphasis is on general context as already explained. The data collected includes information from external sources but emphasizes first-hand information obtained by the research team during its site visit in March 2006.
In presenting the research results here, we have focused primarily on the human rights that would be directly affected by communications technology introduced via the railway: the right to security of the person; the right to privacy; the right to freedom of opinion and expression. However, in the course of our research we also made a number of observations regarding other human rights that are significant in terms of the general context in which the technology is being deployed. These include the right to self-determination; the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and the right to development understood here as the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights.
Discrimination was a cross-cutting issue that had an impact on the enjoyment of all rights.
Although our experience did not allow strict adherence to the methodology and research guide, the material gathered does faithfully reflect the opinions expressed in interviews conducted by researchers during the site visit. As such, it is a fair reflection of community views and the general context in which Nortel is deploying its communications technology in Tibet.
The human right to security of the person
On a visit to China and Tibet in 2005, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture reported “a palpable level of fear and self-censorship which he had not experienced in the course of his previous missions”.51 There can be no doubt that the Tibetan people live in a “climate of fear”, a phrase first coined by an inspection panel sent to Tibet by the World Bank in 2000 to assess the proposed resettlement of 58,000 Chinese farmers into Tibetan areas of Amdo province.52 The panel report was important because it was a mainstream affirmation of what Tibetan refugees have long claimed – that exercising their human rights could threaten their personal liberty and security.
In fact, the research team experienced that same climate of fear. Each time we initiated a conversation with individuals, we worried that our purpose would be exposed. As we self-censored, the responses from interviewees were similarly guarded. If we were able to develop a degree of trust, some subject areas remained taboo, such as the Tibetan government-in-exile, political prisoners, the Panchen Lama and human rights.
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9)
While most people were happy to talk about the railway in a casual conversation, it was difficult to obtain their views about the potential impact of the railway or the new communications technology associated with it. In some cases, people just walked away. In others, heads bowed but no verbal response was offered. One woman told us that when westerners ask such questions, the responses often end up in public reports back in their countries. Chinese authorities have been known to track down sources even months later, she said. In fact, the research team found significant documentation by credible human rights agencies attesting that Tibetans remain in prison for offences that were deemed to threaten state security or promote counterrevolution.53
The threat to personal security extends also to western development organization representatives working in Tibet. Special permits are required to work in the Tibet Autonomous Region and these must be negotiated with the government in Beijing. One westerner, who had been working as a teacher for several years, refused to meet with us. He reportedly feared losing his residence permit or being harassed by the authorities.
The human right to privacy
The Chinese constitution stipulates in Article 40 that all citizens enjoy the “freedom and privacy of correspondence”. Other national laws purport to protect the right to privacy in China. Nevertheless, numerous reports have been written describing the negative impact of China’s Internet Information Services Regulations, and China employs more than 30,000 internet police to implement the regulation.54
The fear of surveillance is palpable among both Tibetans and Chinese living in the Tibet Autonomous Region. Cameras are ubiquitous in public spaces such as train stations, market squares, and tourist sites. We were warned repeatedly to limit our conversations in restaurants, monasteries and even in our own hotel rooms. Individuals felt most comfortable speaking with us outdoors. Our team considered these experiences to be indicators of endemic breaches of the right to privacy. Both Tibetans and Chinese we interviewed were convinced that every private communication could potentially end up in a Public Security Bureau office, with dire consequences. By extension, the research team understood that those same communications would likely enter the Golden Shield database, soon to be supported in part by new communications technology introduced via the railway.
Forced denunciations
While visiting one of Tibet’s three major religious institutions, we encountered a young monk who spoke openly about three fellow monks who had recently been expelled from the monastery for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama. He told us that they had been forced to return to their home village where they are kept under close surveillance. To leave their village even for a day requires prior permission from local authorities and they must report back to police upon return. Local businesses are reluctant to hire them, fearing repercussions from authorities. Once expelled, the monks will never be able to return to the monastery. There was very little one could do to help people in this situation, the monk explained, adding that they fully understood the consequences when they refused to denounce the Dalai Lama. The level of tension in the monastery was extremely high, the monk added, and he cautioned us about speaking to anyone inside the monastery because there might be hidden microphones.
Everyone we met in Tibet – Tibetans, Chinese and westerners – operated on the assumption that all email and telephone communication is monitored. Even when the research team purchased local subscriber identity module (SIM) cards for their cellphones, the government vendor required personal information, including passport details, home address, hotel address, visa number, tour guide number and travel dates. Although some of the same information is required when purchasing a SIM card outside of China, the significance for privacy and personal security is quite different in Tibet, where there are no democratic checks and balances, as we might commonly understand them in Canada.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 17)
When the research team interviewed representatives of western non-governmental organizations, they insisted we meet outside of their offices. One agreed to meet us in the office but quietly pointed to a microphone mounted high on the wall. His responses to our questions were qualified by repeated gestures towards the microphone.
Chinese residents in Tibet also expressed concerns about privacy. During a discussion with a group of Chinese business people and one party official in a restaurant in the Chinese part of Lhasa, we were asked not to repeat or record any of the conversation, even though much of it concerned non-political issues. When the discussion turned to the railway, the group immediately got up and left the room.
Both police and army are highly visible in public spaces and around monasteries. They sit on chairs, drinking tea and taking notes. Columns of police march through public spaces so regularly that they rarely receive a second glance from local people. Nevertheless, the constant atmosphere of surveillance has a distinct impact on the sense of personal security and on other human rights, particularly the human right to freedom of opinion and expression.
The human right to freedom of expression
The right to freedom of opinion and expression is the flip side of the right to privacy and it is dependent in large measure on the right to receive information. From the moment we arrived in Tibet, people constantly warned us about the impact our conversations might have on our own security and on the security of those we spoke with. Everyone in Tibet engages in self-censorship. From pilgrims to bank managers, caution and suspicion characterized all of our encounters. It was in this context that we sought to evaluate respect for freedom of expression and the impact that modern communications technology might have on it.
We were advised not to identify ourselves as representatives of a human rights organization and not to take photos of anyone we interviewed. We were told too much questioning might raise suspicion. While many people declined to engage conversations about sensitive issues, others opened up. The rationale for these leaps of faith seemed to be desperation.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19)
Conversations often ended with the request, “people outside Tibet please help us”.
Numerous individuals reported that the number of internet cafés in major towns has significantly decreased in the past two or three years, particularly in Nagchu and Lhasa. There was no apparent reason. We observed mirrors facing the screens of some computers in some internet cafés, perhaps for surveillance or intimidation. We also noted a sign in a Lhasa internet café reminding users to provide full identification to the café owner before using the internet.
Access to western internet sites was intermittent. One never knew, we were told, when any particular site would be available. The Rights & Democracy site, including its China’s Golden Shield report, was available each time we tested it, while others such as the Tibetan government-in-exile site, were never available. One businessperson interviewed told us that he had once mistakenly accessed a website that included the Dalai Lama’s travel itinerary. A few days later, he said, officers from the Public Security Bureau visited his workplace asking who had accessed the forbidden site. Although there were no repercussions from the incident, it does provide an example of the extent to which surveillance is ubiquitous in Tibet. The research team was often asked to provide proxy server information and to urge Tibetans in western countries to post more information on websites using Chinese text because, they explained, regrettably many young Tibetans are unable to read Tibetan but they all read Chinese.
Freedom of the media is non-existent anywhere in China. State-run news services exist, but access even to these is limited in Tibet. We were unable to obtain even one copy of a Tibetan language newspaper, although we were told that such a publication exists. Tibetans in Lhasa told us not to bother because it contains no information.
We were told repeatedly that radio signals from foreign news agencies such as the British Broadcasting Corporation, Voice of America and Radio Free Asia are frequently jammed. Others complained that the information provided by foreign news agencies was not reliable.
Informal systems of communication operated on a fairly sophisticated level. Primary among these, especially for older Tibetans, are the traditional tea houses where information is shared on issues ranging from politics to housing costs. Younger Tibetans were experimenting with new communication technologies in order to receive information and discuss politics. Many were beginning to use Skype, a voiceover-internet protocol that allows any individual with internet access to speak with others around the world without charge or for a very small cost. Although much of our follow-up research took place using Skype, its degree of security remains unclear and conversation was therefore limited.
The human right to self-determination
(respect for national sovereignty)
In 1997, the International Commission of Jurists published a major study on human rights and the rule of law in Tibet. It concluded that Tibetans are a “people under alien subjugation, entitled under international law to the right of self-determination, by which they freely determine their political status. The Tibetan people have not yet exercised this right, which requires a free and genuine expression of their will.”55 During the course of our research it became clear that inequality in power relations obliterated any pretence that Tibetans had participated in any of the decision making related to the railway.
Interview questions about land rights and community consultation were met with incomprehension. We were not able to find anyone who had been consulted about construction of the railway or about the introduction of modern communication infrastructure along its route. Even the idea that such a consultation might take place was viewed as amusing. Given this reality, there was no reason to ask about compensation or recourse mechanisms; none are available.
Clearly there have been no negotiations with nomadic herders, for example. Nor had the state or company sought any semblance of free, prior, informed consent with regard to the introduction of Nortel’s communications technology across the plateau. There was a stark lack of understanding amongst communities along the railway about the implications it could have for their cultural or political rights. Most did not realize that Nortel’s towers, placed approximately every 6.7 km along the railway track, were related in any way to the functioning of the railway.
Nomadic families we encountered told us that the railway had dissected traditional migratory paths, that yaks feared moving through tunnels created for them beneath the rail tracks, and that the number of people able to maintain the traditional lifestyle was rapidly decreasing. Many had been forced to find work in urban centres. One man explained that he became a taxi driver and now sees his family only occasionally. He worried that Tibetans are increasingly denied access to grazing land on the plateau, including the official nature preserve through which much of the railway travels, while industrial development and infrastructure construction is promoted, and illegal mining by Chinese migrants is tolerated by authorities. This last point was later confirmed by non-governmental organizations interviewed in Lhasa.
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 1)
The research team heard numerous allegations of so-called modernization programs imposed by state authorities to move people off their traditional land and into small clusters of cement block housing. We were told that the pace of settling nomadic communities in this manner, accompanied by fencing of pastures, has accelerated significantly in the past three years. The impact experienced is loss of traditional livelihoods, devastation of communities, and social disenfranchisement.
The human right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
China’s constitution, in Article 46, protects freedom of religious belief, but qualifies the right by stating, “no one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order …”.
No one can visit Tibet without being struck by the deep conviction and reverence for the Buddhist faith shared by all Tibetan people. Wherever we travelled and whatever the situation, prayer wheels turned, incense burned and mantras were chanted. But religion in Tibet is often associated with its political struggle. Photos of the Dalai Lama were revealed hidden behind walls, pictures, mirrors and in the hems of clothing. Devotion to the Dalai Lama is closely associated with concern about the 11th Panchen Lama, whose where-abouts have been unknown since he was abducted by Chinese authorities in May 1995 at the age of five.56 Monks and nuns spoke passionately about the current challenges confronting the traditional monastic system in Tibet: insufficient numbers of Buddhist scholars and qualified teachers; restrictions on the numbers of monks and nuns; and forced re-education in monasteries, including forced denunciation of the Dalai Lama.
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 18)
Monasteries have become little more than tourist sites. Many featured signs congratulating the government for renovations, but in general the research team found they were poorly maintained, with only some sections open and suitable for tourism. Nunneries were in worse shape than monasteries. This was all the more disturbing given the incredible wealth of art contained within these buildings, much of it dating back as far as the 7th century and constituting not only a national heritage, but also a unique part of art history of value to the international community.
As our research group joined an official tour group in a monastery near Lhasa, the Chinese tour guide explained the meaning behind Buddhist statues, mandalas and scriptures as “this shows that Tibet was always part of China” or “this Tibetan king was loyal to China” and other similar statements. We were told that most tour guides now are Chinese, not Tibetan, and a number of examples were cited of Tibetan guides having been arrested for giving inappropriate responses to questions asked by clients. “Our history is being rewritten,” one monk told us. “Please don’t forget us.”
The human right to development
(economic, social and cultural rights)57
In its Declaration on the Right to Development, the United Nations reaffirmed the importance of the right to self-determination as an underlying principle of development, and it preconditioned development on the elimination of human rights violations resulting from racial discrimination, foreign domination or occupation. In 2006, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights released a report expressing concern that disparity in income is widening between the eastern and western provinces of China.58
In fact, endemic poverty amongst rural Tibetans was impossible for the research team to ignore. The vast majority live without electricity, running water, permanent housing, health care, schools, or even motorized transportation. They live as they have for centuries, walking across frozen expanses with their sheep and their yak, seemingly untouched by the incredible pace of development taking place all around them, save for the occasional solar panel.
The recent construction boom, including construction of the railway, does not appear to have had positive implications for Tibetans’ right to work. Infrastructure projects such as the railway require high levels of capital inputs and skilled labour. These come primarily from outside of Tibet, either from China’s eastern provinces and/or from partnership with western companies. A single construction company from Chengdu constructed almost all of the numerous bridges along the railway track, relying mostly on migrant labour from China’s eastern provinces. As a result, the benefits of development accrue outside of Tibet.
Media reports estimate that of the 38,000 jobs generated by construction of the railway, only 6,000 were given to Tibetans.59 We could not find figures specific to the number of workers employed to install the communications infrastructure. The practice of importing labour into Tibet is based on the claim that Tibetans themselves do not have the skills required, and therefore they can carry out only manual tasks, for the lowest pay. This would appear to contradict China’s autonomy regulations, which require training and technical capacity development for minority groups in minority areas.
We observed workers doing unskilled manual labour, such as track maintenance or cement mixing for stations, platforms and access roads, along the railway route. But none of those we approached were Tibetan. We interviewed six Chinese workers who were shovelling cement into moulds. They told us that they had been recruited through an agency in Wuhan province and that they had come to Tibet because wages were good. A few hundred feet away stood a group of young Tibetan men from the area. Even as their traditional livelihoods were undermined by the railway’s disruption of migratory paths, they were excluded from the temporary, unskilled work provided by the railway.
We were told numerous stories about non-existent health care in much of Tibet, and about ethnic discrimination in the health care system, where it did exist. Western development workers explained that Tibetans are increasingly the victims of scams perpetrated by Chinese pharmacists who diagnose ailments and write prescriptions, sell the medicine (often at hugely inflated prices), and even lend patients money to buy that medicine.
At brothels which proliferate along the route of the railway, the sex workers we spoke to did not use condoms. Many of the truckers who form the core of their clientele come from parts of China with significant levels of HIV/AIDS. Without any facilities for testing or treatment, one can only assume that HIV infection will certainly spread beyond the railway route to villages and nomadic communities across the plateau.
…the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 2)
Tibetans often expressed worry about the status of Tibetan language in all areas of life. Commercial signs feature Chinese script, while Tibetan script appears in much smaller size and is often rife with spelling and grammar errors. We were repeatedly told that Tibetan language “has no purpose” or “is not important” or “has no value in obtaining work”. We met many Tibetans who could speak their language but could not write it. Our interviews revealed significant despair among Tibetans confronting the decision to send their children to Chinese schools. One asked, “Why would we send our children to Tibetan school when they need to speak Chinese to get a job and to live?”
A nun’s view of western investors
In one of our most emotional and memorable encounters, an elderly nun responded to questions about the benefits of western investment in Tibet. She said that westerners accompany their investment with good public relations. Many, she said, have knowledge of Tibetan language or Chinese language. They promise that their particular project will bring development to Tibet and to the Tibetan people. Once the project becomes operational, however, it benefits the westerners themselves and their Chinese counterparts. Tibetans remain marginalized and are used in glossy publicity photos for the project. What Tibetans actually need, according to the nun, is improved access to health care, Tibetan language education, and freedom of religion. Western investment never extends to these areas, she said.60
The human right to be free from discrimination
Tibet today is defined by its political relationship with China. On the ground, systemic discrimination is painfully obvious. It permeated all interviews and observations during our mission. The issue is further complicated by the rapidly increasing number of Chinese migrants enticed to Tibet by the assortment of government incentives and a lack of opportunity for Tibetans in their own communities.
The site team observed many specific examples of ethnic discrimination in Tibet. For example, in industries where one might expect Tibetans to be visible, such as tourism, they are rapidly being replaced by Chinese entrepreneurs taking advantage of subsidies not available to local people. In support industries, such as taxi driving, Tibetans have been almost completely excluded. A Chinese driver told us that Chinese people are simply “harder working” than Tibetans who are “too backwards” to be driving taxis. He added that he would never have a Tibetan person in his taxi because “they smell bad”. He explained that he didn’t like living in Tibet, but that the money was good. He acknowledged that it is important to keep monasteries and other tourist spots in operation because they attract tourist dollars – a view we often heard expressed.
We also observed indicators of discrimination at the site of a Canadian mining investment in Shadthongmon, approximately 90 km northwest of Shigatse. At the time of our mission, the mining operation consisted of 10 drilling rigs, with tents for workers and operations. A smelter was under construction. Interviews we conducted in Shadthongmon revealed that local communities had not been consulted and had almost no idea of what all the activity was about. Our research team encountered a group of western business people in Shigatse, and a tense interaction between them, their Chinese hosts, and a member of our mission revealed that advocating for the rights of the Tibetan people would be a definite deterrent to obtaining contracts and licensing rights in the area. One official threatened to take our passports if we did not acknowledge that Tibet is part of China.
States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races…
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Article 2)
Subsequent announcements that the railway would be extended to Shigatse appear to lend credence to the view often expressed by Tibetans that one of the railway’s primary purposes has always been to facilitate the exploitation of Tibet’s mineral riches.
It was the conclusion of the research team that any positive impacts of modern communications technology introduced via the railway would accrue disproportionately to Chinese government officials and entrepreneurs who form the majority of urban populations in Tibet, while for Tibetans, potential advantages would be undermined by constraints such as surveillance, poverty and inappropriate policies.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Surveillance systems have legitimate military, police and civilian uses, but they also have inherent capabilities that facilitate human rights violations when unfettered by the checks and balances taken for granted in most democratic states. It is this state-of-the-art technology and communications equipment that enables the security apparatus of a single-party state to identify and arrest human rights defenders, pro-democracy campaigners, trade union organizers and political dissidents.
In Tibet, the introduction of modern information and communications technology along the Gormo-Lhasa railway is part of a politically motivated, two-track development model that contributes to human rights violations. Specifically, the GSM-R technology provided by Nortel for use on the Gormo-Lhasa railway is part of China’s surveillance architecture and thereby underpins the capacity of the state to monitor dissent and maintain political control in Tibet.
Nortel cannot claim that it lacked prior knowledge about China’s human rights record in Tibet because such information is widely available in Canada. In selling advanced communications technology to the state, the company failed to conduct adequate due diligence, even when shareholders requested that it do so. There is no observed effort on the part of Nortel to assess the potential impact of its investment on human rights.
The technology sold by Nortel to China’s Ministry of Railways is integral to the modernization of China’s military capacity and therefore to the consolidation of its military control in Tibet and more broadly in Central Asia. Increased militarization of the Tibetan plateau constrains the ability of Tibetans to claim their right to self-determination and violates the development guidelines issued by the Tibetan government-in-exile.
Since 2001, the Government of Canada has been aware of civil society concerns related to the Gormo-Lhasa railway and has expressed its own concerns to the Government of China about continued restrictions on freedom of expression, including those resulting from the state’s use of controls and censorship.61 At the same time, however, the Government of Canada has allocated public funds for the promotion of Canadian investment interests in Tibet without assessing the potential impact that specific types of investment could have on human rights. As a result, the government is unable to provide adequate guidance to Canadian companies wishing to invest in Tibet, and it does not condition the provision of government services on respect for human rights.
It may not be possible to conduct a thorough and comprehensive impact assessment in an authoritarian or occupied state. This conclusion naturally brings forward the question of ethics in relation to any foreign investment in such situations. However, it is the view of the research team that even a limited survey provides some valuable insight into the general context for a potential investment. This insight should enable the company and the home state to make decisions about probable future impacts on human rights and to take the appropriate steps to address them or to withdraw from the project.
Recommendations
– For the company
Nortel should conduct human rights impact assessments for its investment projects in China and Tibet. The use of human rights impact assessments should become an integral component of the company’s efforts to ensure corporate accountability in general but specifically when shareholders demand that such a step be taken. Nortel has taken the important and positive step of creating a position within the company to deal specifically with corporate social responsibility. The responsible employee should be encouraged to co-operate with civil society organizations that request collaboration and to engage with affected communities in a way that is relevant to the local context.
Nortel should initiate an effort to develop a best practice approach to corporate accountability within the company. For example, it should launch an immediate investigation into its research and manufacturing operations in China, with special attention to the possible dual-use of the communications technology its sells and transfers to the Government of China. Nortel should also endorse international initiatives that provide a guiding framework for corporate social responsibility, for example the UN Global Compact.
– For the Government of Canada
The Government of Canada should impose temporary restrictions on the export of information and communications technology to China until appropriate steps have been completed to evaluate their potential impact on human rights.
The Government of Canada should encourage a review of its export control legislation, specifically in relation to the international trade in dual-use technology. Such a review might be best undertaken in partnership with other countries, perhaps adopting a model based on the successful campaign to ban landmines, in which Canada initiated an informal process built on the strength of civil society movements and governments from the Commonwealth and La Francophonie.
The Government of Canada should take steps to ensure that its economic relationship with China does not inadvertently support violations of human rights. For example, it should link China’s compliance with human rights law to continued negotiation of the Canada-China Foreign Investment Protection Agreement. The issue of state surveillance and human rights should become a regular discussion topic at all levels of the Canada-China bilateral relationship, including the Canada-China Bilateral Dialogue on Human Rights.
As part of its trade and investment promotion activities in Tibet, the Government of Canada should provide Canadian companies with the development guidelines issued by the Tibetan government-in-exile and it should withdraw trade and investment services, including export credit, when the spirit and intent of those guidelines are not respected.
<<< ENDNOTES
1- UN General Assembly Resolutions 1353 (XIV) 1959, 1723 (XV1) 1961, 2079 (XX) 1965.
2- State Council Information Office. White Paper on regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China. Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2005. http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/ethnic_minorities_2005/ethnic.html (Accessed March 6, 2007).
3- Sorensen, Theodore C., and David L. Phillips. Legal Standards and Autonomy Options for Minorities in China: The Tibetan Case. Harvard: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2004.
4- For a more complete description of China’ western development strategy, see China’s Great Leap West, Tibet Information Network, UK, 2000.
5- Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Concluding observations. E/C.12/1/Add 107. China, May 13, 2005. www.unhchr.ch (Accessed March 6, 2007).
6- UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Tibet: Basic Data. January, 2004. www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/chinadata/tibet.htm (Accessed March 6, 2007).
7- Fisher, Andrew. Poverty by Design: The Economics of Discrimination in Tibet. Canada Tibet Committee, 2002.
8- US Central Intelligence Agency. The Integration of Tibet: China Progress and Problems. Washington: US Central Intelligence Agency, 1970s.
9- See multiple media stories supporting this point of view, for example Ramzy, Austin. “How to Strip-Mine Shangri-la,” Time Magazine. February 22, 2007.
10- Protected source.
11- Factiva. Nortel, General Information.
12- Nortel. 2005 Annual Report. p. 17.
13- “Nortel Cuts 1,900 Jobs,” Spotlightnews. June 27, 2006. www.spotlightingnews.com (Accessed March 6, 2007)
14- Nortel. 2005 Annual Report. p. v.
15- Nortel. 1998 Annual Report. p. 2
16- CBC. “Nortel In-depth.” June 27, 2006. www.cbc.ca/news/background/nortel (Accessed March 6, 2007).
17- Nortel. Form 10-K. (Filed with SEC.) Dec. 31, 2004. www.nortel.com/corporate/investor/sec.html (Accessed March 7, 2007).
18- Neumeister, Larry. “Nortel Lawsuit Settlements Approved.” Associated Press, Dec. 26, 2006.
19- Nortel. Asia Pacific Overview. www.nortel.com/corporate/global/asia/index.html (Accessed March 7, 2007).
20- Nortel. Nortel China. http://ad.chinahr.com/2005/bj/nortel (Accessed March 7, 2007).
21- “Nortel Selected by China West-East Gasline project.” Telecomworldwire. Dec. 21, 2005.
22- These involve programs such as the Nortel Foundation and the Nortel Learnt Centre, which has provided programs to NASA, The North Carolina Department of Public Instruction and internationally, the Pakistan Center for Youth Technology Training. www.nortel.com/corporate/community/citizenship/education.html (Accessed March 6, 2007).
23- “Report to Shareholders on Human Rights Policies in China and Tibet,” The Ethical Fund Proxy Alert. June 29, 2006.
24- Bruser, David. “Nortel CEO dismisses talk of imminent sale,” Toronto Star. June 30, 2006.
25- “China Railcom transferred to SASAC,” People’s Daily. January 31, 2004.
26- Ibid.
27- Nortel. China Ministry of Railways Selects Nortel to Provide GSM-R Network for Qinghai-Tibet Railway: Follow Pioneering Year-long Trial on the World’s Highest Rail Line. Press release. March 16, 2005.
28- Bin Wang, Qingchao Wei, Qulin Tan, Shonglin Yang, Baigen Cai. Integration of GIS, GPS and GSM for the Qinghai-Tibet railway information management planning. Beijing: Beijing Jiatong University. Schools of Civil Engineering & Architecture and Electronics and Information Engineering.
29- Tripplet, W. The Dragon in the Indian Ocean. China Brief, Vol. 3, Issue 4. Feb. 25, 2003. www.jamestown.org (Accessed March 7, 2007).
30- York, Geoffrey. “From Beijing to Tibet, Controversy on Rails,” Globe and Mail. July 2, 2006.
31- “Sabotage angst along Tibet Railway.” World Tibet Network News. Aug. 26, 2006. www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2006/8/26_2.html (Accessed March 7, 2007).
32- Owens, Admiral William A. The Emerging U.S. System-of-Systems. Strategic Forum, No. 63. February 1996. www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF_63/forum63.html (Accessed March 7, 2007).
33- “Xinjiang to be turned into largest oil, gas supplier.” China View, June 20, 2005. http://news.xinhuanet.com english/2005-06/20/content_3110944.htm (Accessed March 7, 2007).
34- Arquilla, John and Ronfeldt, David. “Swarming and the Future of Conflict” Rand Organization. www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311.
35- Rahman, Azizur. “Silk Road pass to reopen Thursday: Economists predict benefits for Sikkim,” Toronto Star. July 3, 2006.
36- Ibid.
37- Walton, Greg. China’s Golden Shield: Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the People’s Republic of China. Montreal: Rights & Democracy, 2001. (www.dd-rd.ca)
38- China Railcom, part of the Ministry of Railways, is using the national rail network to support one of China’s three largest telecom networks. The backbone links China Railcom branches in 150 cities across China at gigabit speeds.
39- “Information of 1.25b Chinese in police data bank.” China View, April 7, 2006. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/ (Accessed March 7, 2007).
40- Foreign Affairs Canada, email message to Rights & Democracy, August 28, 2006.
41- EDC, email to Rights & Democracy, October 18, 2001.
42- For example, see market research reports Rail and Urban Transit Infrastructure Development and Equipment in China, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2001, and The Telecommunications Market in China, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 2001. Both available at www.infoexport.gc.ca
43- Examples include the Team Canada mission headed by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, which included a “Luncheon in Honour of Leaders from Canada and Western China” in 2001; the letter of intent for cooperation in western development, 2001; several market research reports published by Canadian Trade Commissioner Service; and a visit by Secretary of State Raymond Chan to Tibet in 2000 to pursue opportunities related to China’s Western Development Strategy.
44- “China Is Technically, Financially Able to Build Qinghai-Tibet Railway: Official.” China People’s Daily. March 7, 2001. http://english.people.com.cn/200103/07/ (Accessed March 7, 2007)
45- Foreign Affairs Canada, email message to Rights & Democracy, August 28, 2006.
0 Human Rights Impact Assessments for Foreign Investment Projects
46- Xu Minyang, ed. Guidelines of Investment in Tibet. People’s Government of Tibet Autonomous Region, 2000 (Accessed March 7, 2007).
47- The full text of the guidelines is available at www.tibet.net/diir/eng/enviro/guide (Accessed March 7, 2007).
48- Human Rights at Risk on the Cyber-battlefield. (Briefing paper). Montreal: Rights & Democracy, 2004. www.dd-rd.ca (Accessed March 7, 2007).
49- See Canada’s FIPA model at http://www.international.gc.ca
50- Tibetan Policy Act is available at www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rpt/20699.htm
51- UN. Special Rapporteur on Torture Highlights Challenges at the end of visit to China. (Press release) United Nations, December 2, 2005.
52- Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: China Western Poverty Reduction Project (Credit No. 3255-CHA and Loan No. 4501-CHA) IPN Request RQ99/3, August 18, 1999, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington DC, para. 22
53- See for example, Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org; The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Development, www.tchrd.org; Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org; and the Congressional Executive Committee on China, www.cecc.gov. Note: counterrevolution was removed from China’s Criminal Law in 1997.
54- See http://technology.guardian.co.uk/online/news/0,12597,1505988,00.html (Accessed March 7, 2007).
55- International Commission of Jurists. Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Geneva, 1997. p. 345.
56- For background information on the case of the Panchen Lama, see The 11th Panchen Lama of Tibet: Child Prisoner at www.tibet.ca/publications (Accessed March 7, 2007).
57- While the right to development encompasses civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights, we have used it in this study as a reference to the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights.
58- Ibid. 4.
59- Ni, Ching-Ching. “Tibetans Fear Strangulation by Rail,” Los Angeles Times. October 29, 2003 www.savetibet.org/news/newsitem.php?id=535 (Accessed March 7, 2007)
60- This opinion was also expressed directly to the Government of Canada during a meeting with Tibetan community representatives held in Lhasa in 2002.
61- Foreign Affairs Canada, email message to Rights & Democracy, August 28, 2006.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Comments always welcome!